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Restricting Second Amendment Rights to the “Virtuous” 
by 
Royce de R. Barondes* 
ABSTRACT 
To the woes of the victims of American over-criminalization, we can 
add deprivation of the suitable tools for self-defense during national 
emergency and civil unrest. Federal law disarms “unlawful users” of 
controlled substances (including medical marijuana), and imposes a 
permanent firearms ban on substantially all those with prior felony 
convictions. A notable exception is made for white-collar criminals with 
felony violations of antitrust and certain business practice statutes. 
The constitutionality of these restrictions typically is founded on the 
view that one is tainted as “non-virtuous” for any serious criminal 
conviction, which includes any felony conviction. Using extensive 
sampling, this article shows that reliance on this theory is discredited 
outside the context of the Second Amendment. Modern reliance on the 
theory, outside the context of firearms rights, has been very infrequent 
and has been used to validate odious statutes, in cases no longer good law. 
The unsound judicial effort to derive the validation of these firearms 
bans from Founding-Era firearms restrictions builds on erroneous 
premises. The Founding-Era restrictions, detailed in this article, were 
tailored to the circumstances and do not provide a foundation for the 
broad, essentially permanent bans that federal law provides and that 
courts typically validate. 
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To the woes of the victims of American over-criminalization, we can 
add deprivation of the suitable tools for self-defense during national 
emergency and civil unrest. In 2020, there has been an astonishing 
increase in persons turning to firearms for self-protection, in which first-
time firearms owners are prominently participating.1 Yet federal law 
provides that for being an “unlawful user” of controlled substances, even 
medical-marijuana used in compliance with state law, one forfeits the 
right to possess firearms.2 And a generally permanent firearms ban 
attends any felony conviction, whether related to a propensity for violent 
 
1   E.g., Jim Curcuruto, Millions of First-Time Gun Buyers During COVID-19, NSSF 
(June 1, 2020), https://www.nssf.org/millions-of-first-time-gun-buyers-during-covid-19/ 
(noting “year-over-year increases [in retail firearm sales] of 80 percent in March and 69 
percent in April 2020,” “estimating that 40 percent of [retail] sales were to [first-time gun 
buyers],” and stating, “The early part of 2020 has been unlike any other year for firearm 
purchases . . . .”). 
2   18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91) (also including persons 
addicted to controlled substances); Arthur Herbert, Assistant Director, Enforcement 
Programs and Services, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Open Letter 
to all Federal Firearms Licensees (Sept. 21, 2011), www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/open-
letter/all-ffls-sept2011-open-letter-marijuana-medicinal-purposes).  
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misconduct or not, except—as may epitomize some of the infuriating 
aspect of over-criminalization—as to posh criminals whose felonies involve 
certain “business practices.” Felony convictions for crimes involving 
certain business practices do not result in federal forfeiture of one’s federal 
firearms rights.3 
These prohibitions have profound impacts in some communities. A 
recent article estimates, “people with felony convictions account for 8% of 
all adults and 33% of the African American adult male population.”4 A 
substantial portion of these persons will have been disarmed for crimes 
that do not evidence a higher propensity for violent misconduct.5 Others 
will be disarmed by long-stale convictions that are no longer probative of a 
propensity to violence. 
The constitutionality of these firearms prohibitions has been founded 
on a view that supports disarmament of persons who do not have a 
heightened propensity to be violent. Courts have relied on the view that 
one who has committed a requisite predicate act—current unlawful use of 
controlled substances or conviction for any felony—is not “virtuous,” and 
the non-virtuous for that alone can be deprived of this express right.6  
Sherry describes the Founding Era conceptualization of the “virtuous” 
in the following way: “Responsibility, independence and community spirit 
are some of the modern concepts that come closest to capturing the 
meaning of civic virtue.”7 It has also been described as involving 
sublimation of one’s personal interests to those of the common good or 
public welfare.8 The rationalization for linking firearms rights to being 
“virtuous,” in brief, is that the Founders perceived a need for a virtuous 
citizenry, whose exercise of certain civil rights was considered crucial to 
 
3   See infra notes 43–53 and accompanying text. 
4   Sarah K. S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People 
with Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1795 (2017). 
5   A survey of 2004 state convictions finds, for example, that the most serious 
conviction offense for 24 percent of state felony convictions was fraud or mere 
drug possession.  See, e.g., Matthew R. Durose, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State 
Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 2004—Statistical Tables tbl.4.2 (July 1, 
2007), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1533. 
6   E.g., United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (referencing an 
historical justification for validating the disarmament of persons with felony convictions as 
non-virtuous and stating, “And that reasoning applies with equal force to Congress’s 
extension of the firearms ban to another category of habitual criminals with § 922(g)(3).”); 
United States v. Conrad, 923 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850 (W.D. Va. 2013) (stating that authority 
from the Fourth Circuit holds the Second Amendment “is enjoyed only by ‘law-abiding, 
responsible citizens;’” that “the government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens;’” and that “a 
user of controlled and illegal substances[] could not claim the status of being a law-abiding 
citizen.” (quoting United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir. 2012))). 
7   Suzanna Sherry, “Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty,” 78 MINN. L. REV. 61, 69 
(1993). 
8   See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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effective governance. This perspective is extended by courts to support the 
view that the non-virtuous can be deprived of firearms rights. 
This article catalogues the contemporary status of not extending 
certain constitutional rights to the “non-virtuous,” using sampling to 
collect a database of illustrative opinions. It formalizes Adam Winkler’s 
casual observations on the subject, provided in the aftermath of the 
Court’s initial recognition of the Second Amendment’s protecting an 
individual right.9 
The sample reveals that modern reliance on this theory is almost 
exclusively confined to litigation involving Second Amendment rights.10 
The contemporary authority addressing the theory in contexts not 
involving the Second Amendment, in fact, typically rejects the principle. 
And the primary theme of the infrequent contemporary cases to the 
contrary, not involving the Second Amendment, is the support of odious 
governmental restriction on intimate activity that are not good law. If 
judges validating permanent firearms bans for the “non-virtuous” wish to 
rely on constitutional constructs modernly discredited and used to validate 
criminalization of private, non-commercial same-sex and heterosexual 
intimate activity, their opinions ought to be known by the notorious 
intellectual company they keep. 
In particular, this article reports the results of a review of each 
reported case since 1969 including the word “virtuous” and referencing one 
of three contemporary standards of Equal Protection review but not 
referencing the term “Second Amendment.”11 The results indicate that 
cases depriving persons of firearms rights on the basis they are “non-
 
9   Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1563 n.67 (2009) (citing, 
inter alia, Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter 1986, at 143, 146; and Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the 
Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 480 (1995)).  
Adam Winkler noted, “Scholars have offered two historical bases for excluding felons 
from the Second Amendment”: (i) that the amendment’s scope, limited to “the people,” 
excludes felons; and (ii) that the Founding-Era understanding was that only “virtuous” 
citizens benefitted. Id. As we shall see, see infra notes 120–122 and accompanying text, 
modern jurisprudence typically founds the constitutionality of broad firearms bans arising 
from prior criminal convictions on the second basis. Relying on exclusion of felons from the 
set of “the people” was implicitly rejected in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
580 (2008) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990), where 
the Court suggests the term “the people” has a common meaning in various parts of the Bill 
of Rights).  
Winkler rejected both of those approaches, and tethered the validity of felon 
disarmament to felons simply being too dangerous. Winkler, supra, at 1563 n.67. Winkler 
articulates the principle for rejecting the second-listed principle in this way: “In modern 
constitutional law, rights are not selectively doled out by legislatures to those whom elected 
officials deem to be sufficiently virtuous or worthy.” Id. 
10   See infra Part V. 
11   That is, the following Westlaw search of opinions was performed: adv: virtuous & 
(“rational basis” or “intermediate scrutiny” or “strict scrutiny”). 
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virtuous” are irreconcilable with the principle, articulated in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago,12 that the constitutional rights protected by the Second 
Amendment are not “second-class.”13 
Additionally, this article details the mechanism in the Founding Era 
that would have restrained dangerous conduct of criminals, post-sentence. 
It shows those arrangements are not analogous the contemporary federal 
firearms ban, which effects a wholesale,14 generally permanent ban on a 
broad class of persons—a ban that is untethered to any propensity for 
future violence. Rather, the Founding-Era analogues provided a tailored 
approach, with an impact that varied based on the circumstances.15 And, 
as is often overlooked, the tailored Founding-Era analogues in fact 
restricted firearms possession that would not otherwise be a breach of the 
peace.16 In sum, judicial efforts to validate permanent felon prohibitions on 
firearms possession, on the basis that this view is compelled by the 
Founding-Era understanding of firearms rights, simply lack an 
understanding of the historical context. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part II sketches the 
current contours of the federal prohibition on firearms possession, and its 
development. It sketches the oft-overlooked exception in the felon 
prohibition, referenced above,17 for some white-collar crimes.18 It also 
reveals that the current prohibition is not as longstanding as a casual 
 
12   561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
13   McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion) 
(“Municipal respondents, in effect, ask us to treat the right recognized in Heller as a 
second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights 
guarantees that we have held to be incorporated into the Due Process Clause.”). See also 
Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2018) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (“Nearly eight years ago, this Court declared that the Second Amendment is 
not a ‘second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of 
Rights guarantees.’” (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 780 (plurality opinion)); id. (“The right 
to keep and bear arms is apparently this Court’s constitutional orphan.”); Voisine v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2292 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court continues to 
‘relegat[e] the Second Amendment to a second-class right.’” (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Friedman v. Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari))). 
By way of perspective, one can note that United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), 
relies on an assertion that the non-enumerated right to join in a homosexual marriage 
inherently cannot involve a “second-class” or “second-tier” marriage. Id. at 771. 
14   As noted below, the federal prohibition has an exception for prior felony convictions 
involving some “business practices,” although some state prohibitions arise from any felony 
conviction. See infra notes 30, 60 and accompanying text. The existence of this federal 
exclusion is not integral to the representative constitutional analysis under which the 
federal felon firearms ban is immune from even as-applied challenges. See infra notes 73–
81, 120–122. 
15   See infra Part V.E. 
16   See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
17   See supra text accompanying note 3. 
18   See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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reading of the literature might suggest.19 This latter observation is 
relevant, because when the Supreme Court held that the firearms rights 
secured by the Second Amendment are individual rights (as opposed to 
some form of collective rights),20 it volunteered dicta stating, in relevant 
part, “[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons . . . .”21 
Although a footnote indicates specified longstanding prohibitions are 
merely presumptively lawful,22 the extent to which restrictions are 
longstanding is relevant, insofar as courts seek to treat this Supreme 
Court dicta as announcing an operative standard. 
Our development below of the constitutionality of predicate acts 
creating federal firearms bans focuses on the ban for persons with prior 
felony convictions. Similar principles have been used to justify the ban 
applicable to unlawful users of controlled substances.23  
Part III briefly sketches the approaches courts have taken in 
challenges to the ban arising from conviction of a crime punishable by 
imprisonment of more than one year. As noted there, federal circuits hold 
the extant federal felon firearms possession is facially constitutional, with 
many (but not all) holding that as-applied challenges are also barred. As 
noted in Part III, cases broadly validating the felon firearm prohibition 
rely on the notion that the non-virtuous were excluded from benefitting 
from constitutionally secured firearms rights.  
Part IV briefly sketches the Founding-Era conceptualization of 
virtuous citizens. That involved “community spirit,” and sublimation of 
personal interests to the common good. Part V demonstrates that the 
Founding-Era analogues that restricted the activity of dangerous persons 
are qualitatively different from the current, broad felon firearms bans that 
some contemporary courts hold are beyond further judicial scrutiny. It 
shows the thread of judicial authority that broadly validates felon firearms 
possession, exempting them from as-applied challenges, relies on a 
disingenuously curated selection of Founding-Era authority. 
A focus on the original understanding, to the exclusion of another 
approach to constitutional interpretation, is taken, because that is the 
 
19   See infra notes 38–54 and accompanying text. 
20   District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). The holding was made 
applicable to the states in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (plurality 
opinion). 
21   Id. at 626. 
22   Id. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only 
as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”). See generally C. Kevin Marshall, 
Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have A Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 696–97 (2009) 
(critically examining the authority for the felon disenfranchisement dicta). 
23   See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The choice in the manner of exposition is 
dictated by the fact that the primary cases involve felon bans. 
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approach the relevant courts take. One supposes that, in light of the 
ordinary contemporary rejection of the principle that the non-virtuous can 
be denied express rights, this judicial choice frames the analysis so as to 
bias it in favor of validating the firearms restrictions. 
To read into the Second Amendment an implicit exception for those 
who had previously committed any serious crime would require that there 
was a salient understanding, in the Founding Era,24 that those persons 
had permanently forfeited their firearms rights. Because Part V shows 
there was no such salient Founding-Era understanding, Part VI then 
examines the principle, occasionally referenced in other contexts, that the 
non-virtuous may be deprived of constitutional rights.  
That Part examines whether the principle is sufficiently recognized 
that it may on its own justify the general validation of broad felon firearms 
bans. As noted there, very few cases rely on this theory for depriving a 
class of persons of constitutional rights. And those that do are no longer 
good law, validating restrictions on private, non-commercial sexual 
activity. The statutory restrictions those cases validate are odious. The 
opinions broadly validating felon firearms bans, and the judges who write 
those opinions, ought to be known by the odious intellectual company that 
they keep. 
II. THE CURRENT FEDERAL FELON PROHIBITION AND ITS HISTORY 
In relevant part, federal law currently criminalizes firearms 
possession by a person who has been convicted25 of (i) “a crime punishable 
 
24   There is a threshold issue of whether the historical limit on state restrictions ought 
to reference the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. E.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 
F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018) (“Because the challenge here is directed at a state law, the 
pertinent point in time would be 1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified).”), 
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Apr. 1, 2019) (18–1272). See generally, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, 
Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 449 (2009) (stating, “This shift in 
the public understanding of individual liberty suggests that what we are after is not the 
incorporation of 1787 texts, but the public understanding of 1868 texts . . . .”). In light of 
this article’s primary focus on a federal restriction, this article will not probe that 
understanding. 
25   What constitutes a “conviction” is determined by “the law of the jurisdiction in which 
the proceedings were held.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91). 
This provision can give rise to peculiar issues. For example, a Missouri suspended 
imposition of a sentence does not result in a conviction for purposes of depriving a person of 
his or her federal firearms rights. United States v. Thornton, 766 F.3d 875, 877 & n.1 (8th 
Cir. 2014); but cf. United States v. Love, 59 F. App’x 165, 166 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Under 
Arkansas law, a determination that a person is guilty of a felony is a conviction even 
though the court suspended imposition of the sentence.”). However, in Missouri, a 
suspended execution of sentence does result in a disqualifying conviction. United States v. 
Bass, No. 09–CR–00230–DME, 2010 WL 2573990, at *3 (D. Colo. June 23, 2010); see State 
v. Fikes, 597 S.W.3d 330, 332 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019), transfer denied (Jan. 23, 2020), 
transfer denied (Apr. 28, 2020); Berryman v. United States, No. 11–0793–CV–W–DGK, 
2012 WL 1438760, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2012). 
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by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,”26 colloquially referenced 
as a ban on felon firearm possession, or (ii) “a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence.”27 Federal law also criminalizes that possession by a 
person currently subject to a specified type of domestic violence 
restraining order.28  
There is a required interstate commerce nexus, but it is extremely 
broad. It extends, inter alia, to any “possess[ion] in or affecting commerce” 
and “receiv[ing] any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”29  
However, there are some idiosyncratic limits on what is colloquially 
referenced as the federal felon firearms ban. First, it excludes “any Federal 
or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, 
restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of 
business practices.”30 Second, it excludes “any State offense classified by 
the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of two years or less.”31 
As a general matter, i.e., subject to some limited exceptions, the 
current federal felon firearms ban is permanent.32 The underlying crime 
can be either a federal crime or a state crime. The jurisdiction of the 
predicate crime may endeavor to ameliorate the collateral firearms 
consequences of the conviction, post-sentence. The actual impact of those 
restorative actions under federal law is rather complicated,33 and we shall 
not endeavor to detail them here. 
 
26   18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91). 
27   18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). There are other prohibitions, e.g., for “alien[s] . . . illegally or 
unlawfully in the United State,” for unlawful users of controlled substances, persons 
“adjudicated as . . . mental defective[s],” or “committed to . . . mental institution[s].” Id. 
§ 922(g). 
28   Id. § 922(g)(8). 
29   Id. § 922(g). 
30   Id. § 921(a)(20)(A).  
31   18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). 
32   A statutorily-authorized process for federal reinstatement of firearms rights has not 
been funded in recent years. E.g., Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2019). 
33   Reinstatement of rights under state law may not reinstate rights under federal law. 
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (“Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which 
a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a 
conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of 
civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive 
firearms.”). A qualifying restoration of “civil rights” requires restoration of civil rights 
generally—restoration of firearms rights alone is insufficient. E.g., United States v. 
Woodall, 120 F.3d 880, 881 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Estrella, 104 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 
1997) (stating, “[E]ach of the three core ‘civil rights’ must be substantially, but not 
perfectly, restored,” and identifying those three as “rights to vote, to hold public office, and 
to serve on a jury”).  
Additionally, firearms rights cannot be subject to ongoing limitation. Where state law 
only partially restores a person’s firearms rights following a state conviction initially 
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Both the historical development of the federal ban on felon firearms 
possession and its current scope are often misleadingly described. For 
example, Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller write: “The federal ban on 
possession by felons, for example, did not exist until 1938 and did not 
extend to all felons until 1968.”34 Lawrence Rosenthal has written, “The 
Firearms Act of 1938 required a license to ship firearms in interstate 
commerce and prohibited transfers to specified classes of individuals 
including certain convicted felons, fugitives from justice, and persons 
under indictment.”35 These statements are misleading in a number of 
ways. 
Dicta in District of Columbia v. Heller,36 discussed below,37 introduced 
into the Second Amendment jurisprudence some suggestion that a 
restriction being longstanding evidences its validity. In that context, what 
might otherwise be innocuous simplifications, misstating the longevity of 
firearms restrictions, become substantially misleading. It is therefore 
important to detail the extent to which only well after 1968 did the 
portfolio of federal firearms restrictions transition to current restrictive 
regime.  
First, the relevant federal firearms prohibition before 1968 did not 
provide a complete ban for covered persons with prior felony convictions. 
Rather, by its terms it was limited to “any firearm . . . which has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.38 Moreover, it 
was subject to a narrow interpretation, recited in Tot v. United States:39 
 
resulting in a federal firearms prohibition—so there remains a state restriction on the 
possession of some firearms—the state restoration of rights will not reinstate federal 
firearms rights. Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 310 (1998). An ongoing state limit 
that merely prohibits obtaining a concealed weapons permit has been held sufficient to 
prevent firearms rights reinstatement under federal law. Van Der Hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d 
1043, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 2014). Curiously, if a state conviction does not result in loss of civil 
rights, the rights are not treated as restored for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 921. Logan v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 23, 37 (2007). 
34   Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, 
Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 
327–28 (2016). 
35   Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the 
Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1187, 1211–12 (2015). Rosenthal 
relies in part on an opinion written by Judge Easterbrook. Id. at 1223–24. Easterbrook 
wrote in part, as to that 1938 act: “The first federal statute disqualifying felons from 
possessing firearms was not enacted until 1938; it also disqualified misdemeanants who 
had been convicted of violent offenses. (Technically the crime was ‘receipt’ of a gun that had 
crossed state lines; the statute treated possession as evidence of receipt.)” United States v. 
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation omitted). 
36   554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
37   See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
38   Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No.  75–785, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 (1938) 
(repealed 1968). 
39   319 U.S. 463 (1943). 
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Both courts below held that the offense created by the Act is 
confined to the receipt of firearms or ammunition as a part of 
interstate transportation and does not extend to the receipt, in an 
intrastate transaction, of such articles which, at some prior time, 
have been transported interstate. The Government agrees that 
this construction is correct.40 
So, before 1968, federal law did not inherently criminalize a felon’s firearm 
possession in his or her state of residence. 
Second, the current federal ban on possession does not extend to “all” 
persons with prior felony convictions. In fact, the 1968 federal felon 
firearm possession ban had multiple components that operated to restrict 
its scope, which remains in diminished form. The federal prohibition as in 
effect in 1968 had provisions that, if given full effect, would have made the 
ban’s scope similar to Founding-Era restrictions, which are discussed 
below.41 
Per Se Exclusion of Certain Crimes Regulating Business Practices. As 
noted above,42 the crimes that currently gives rise to a federal firearms 
ban exclude “any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust 
violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar 
offenses relating to the regulation of business practices.”43 The list of 
disqualifying predicate crimes had been expanded by a 1961 statutory 
amendment from the more limited set of persons who had committed 
“crime[s] of violence”44 (although, as noted above,45 the pre-1968 
prohibition had a limited scope and did not operate generally to disarm a 
covered person). 
 
40   Id. at 466 (emphasis added); see also Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 226 
(1976) (White, J., concurring) (“Thus after Tot, and as long as Congress left § 2(f) intact, to 
establish a violation of § 2(f) it was necessary to prove that a convicted felon found in 
possession of a firearm actually participated in an interstate shipment.”). 
41   See infra Part V.E. 
42   See supra note 3, 30 and accompanying text. 
43   18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A). This is not prominently discussed in Blocher & Miller, 
supra note 34. A Westlaw search of that article for the relevant textual components of the 
exclusion (search: adv: (antitrust or “anti-trust” or “trade practices” or “restraints of trade” 
or “business practices” or “921(a)(20)!”) reveals a sole reference to antitrust, and that is not 
on-point. Blocher & Miller, supra note 34, at 344 n.282. 
44   An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87–342, 75 Stat. 757 
(1961); see also Marshall, supra note 22, at 698–99 (discussing the historical development 
of the federal statutory prohibitions). Continuing our trend of courts overstating the scope 
of historical firearms restrictions, United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010), 
references “the pedigree of the rule against even nonviolent felons possessing weapons 
(which was codified in federal law in 1938),” id. at 684, although the limited federal 
restriction on firearms possession arising from prior criminal convictions, which did not 
prohibit acquisitions in wholly intrastate transactions, see supra note 38 and 
accompanying text, was linked to “crime[s] of violence.” 
45   See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
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Additional Exclusions from Disqualifying Crimes. As developed 
below,46 the Founding-Era procedures for restricting firearms possession 
by violent persons were tailored, accommodating assessments that limited 
the restrictions to those who had a propensity for violence, and that had 
durations that could be tailored to the circumstances.47 The first federal 
act that operated broadly, generally to prevent firearms possession by 
persons with prior serious convictions, the Gun Control Act of 1968,48 had 
multiple mechanisms that can be viewed as seeking to replicate, albeit 
imperfectly through different means, the type of tailoring that broad 
firearms prohibitions had in the Founding Era. But the mechanisms used 
in the Gun Control Act were not implemented efficaciously, and were 
curtailed or eliminated. 
The Gun Control Act of 1968 delegated authority to the Secretary of 
the Treasury to identify other offenses, similar to antitrust and unfair 
trade violations, that also would not be disqualifying.49 Thoughtful 
exercise of this administrative authority could have operated to exclude 
prohibitions being applied to many persons whose convictions did not 
evidence higher propensities to commit violence, by a broad regulatory 
interpretation of the statutory language. Thus, that could have been a part 
of allowing the new, broad federal restrictions to have some significant 
level of qualitative similarity to the Founding-Era restrictions. 
But the Executive Branch, though administrations of both political 
parties, had no appetite to protect the firearms rights of the non-
dangerous persons with prior convictions. The authority, apparently, was 
wholly neglected.50  
The federal law transitioned in 1986, from a regime in which Congress 
contemplated that the Executive Branch would protect the firearms rights 
of certain non-violent offenders, to one that reallocated the neglected 
authority to the courts. Although this statutory change was part of an act 
styled the “Firearms Owners’ Protection Act,”51 it failed in affording 
material protection. The courts have been only slightly better in giving 
effect to that limitation on the federal ban,52 which is most succinctly 
 
46   See infra Part V.E. 
47   See infra Part V.E. 
48   Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 26 U.S.C.). 
49   Gun Control Act of 1968, § 102, 82 Stat. at 1216; see also supra note 30. 
50   United States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408, 414 n.4 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Our research has 
not revealed any offense so designated by the Secretary under this prior version, nor any 
indication of Congress’s rationale for deleting that language.”). 
51   Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99–308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–926A, 929; and 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 
No. 116–91)). 
52   This provision has been given a relatively narrow construction by the courts. United 
States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408, 415–16 (8th Cir. 2007), states, “[I]mplicit in the term 
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evidenced by cavalier omission of the exception from some statements 
summarizing the federal firearms prohibitions. That this strand of caselaw 
started decades before District of Columbia v. Heller,53 and has analysis 
inconsistent with Heller,54 may account in part for the inefficacy of the 
statutory provision. 
Reinstatement Procedures. The final component of the limits on broad 
firearms dispossession otherwise created by the Gun Control Act of 1968 
for prior serious crimes, in addition to expungement or pardon,55 consists 
of express procedures allowing reinstatement of firearms rights.56 
However, “[s]ince 1992, Congress has prohibited ATF from expending 
appropriated funds to investigate or act upon applications for relief from 
federal firearms disabilities.”57  
It is not being suggested that the procedures originally framed in 1986 
to allow reinstatement of firearms rights, together with the exclusions for 
various crimes referenced above, initially resulted in a scope of federal 
firearms prohibitions equivalent to the scope of the corresponding 
provisions in the Founding Era. Reinstatement, when last funded, was not 
 
‘unfair trade practices’ is the requirement of an adverse economic effect on competition or 
consumers.” The exclusion has been found not to extend to prior convictions concerning, 
inter alia, (i) a fraudulent check-cashing scheme, United States v. Miller, 678 F.3d 649, 
651, 653 (8th Cir. 2012); (ii) “conspiracy to manufacture or distribute equipment for 
decrypting satellite cable signals” and for “willfully infring[ing] a copyright,” United States 
v. Coleman, 609 F.3d 699, 702, 705–06 (5th Cir. 2010); (iii) fraudulent distribution of 
adulterated meat products and their misbranding, and related deceptive conduct, Stanko, 
491 F.3d at 410, 418–19 (asserting that the purpose of predicate crimes was “to protect 
public health” and that the crimes “do not involve an economic effect on competition or 
consumers”); (iv) “bringing a lady’s wristwatch worth $9,000 into the United States by 
means of a false customs declaration,” United States v. Meldish, 722 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 
1983); and (v) importation of tobacco products without paying requisite state tax, United 
States v. Horma, No. 3:18CR18, 2018 WL 4214136, at *12 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4, 2018). But see 
Reyes v. Sessions, 342 F. Supp. 3d 141, 144, 156 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding, inter alia, prior 
conviction under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), for 
securities fraud, arising from false filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, is 
within the exception). See generally United States v. Geyler, 932 F.2d 1330, 1336 n.9 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (indicating federal convictions for “mail fraud or securities fraud” are outside the 
exception), abrogated on other grounds by Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (1994). 
53   554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
54   E.g., Meldish, 722 F.2d at 28 (stating, “Because the receiving and possessing of 
firearms is not a basic constitutional right, the classification must be upheld if it has any 
rational support.”). 
55   See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
56   See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1225 (1968) 
(codified in pertinent part, as amended, in 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
116–91)). 
57   Granting of Relief; Federal Firearms Privileges, 84 Fed. Reg. 1491, 1492 (Feb. 4, 
2019). However, since 1993, the prohibition has not applied to corporations’ requests. Id. 
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widespread. Only 313 persons had firearms rights reinstated in 1991 
through the above-described procedure.58  
Rather, the point is that courts or scholars may be inclined to frame 
the federal restrictions as banning, since 1968 (or some earlier point in 
time), firearms possession by all persons with prior felony convictions, so 
that such restrictions are “longstanding” and, thus, deemed constitutional 
under dicta in Heller. And that framing is simply incorrect. The broad 
federal ban for those with prior convictions, first adopted in 1968, had a 
number of exceptions that allowed judicial and Executive Branch action to 
mitigate the broad ban, so that the federal ban could have had an impact 
similar to the results of the tailored process extant in the Founding Era. 
And notwithstanding a general congressional logjam in respect of firearms 
rights, Congress in 1986 endeavored to make efficacious one of the 
previously neglected curbs on those firearms restrictions, albeit again 
without much effect.  
It is a separate question whether, if those curbs had been vigorously 
implemented in the 1970s, any variation in their structure or impact from 
the Founding-Era analogue would have been too substantial from the 
Founding-Era restrictions to be constitutional. But, whatever the proper 
analysis of those counterfactual possibilities would be, it remains clear 
that the current, broad restriction dates only from 1993 (although the ban 
as to violent persons with prior felony convictions would predate that59), 
and it is not as a whole “longstanding.”  
State Prohibitions. There are, of course, state prohibitions on firearms 
possession arising from prior convictions. The acts giving rise to a 
prohibition in some states include, inter alia, the commission of any 
felony60 (or even an out-of-state misdemeanor that would be a felony if 
 
58   See Granting of Relief, Federal Firearms Privileges, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,926 (Dec. 19, 
1991); Granting of Relief, Federal Firearms Privileges, 56 Fed. Reg. 36,865 (Aug. 1, 1991); 
Granting of Relief, Federal Firearms Privileges, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,713 (June 10, 1991); 
Granting of Relief, Federal Firearms Privileges, 56 Fed. Reg. 14971 (Apr. 12, 1991). 
59   Reinstatement was denied in the Gun Control Act of 1968 to persons with felonies 
involving the use of firearms. Gun Control Act of 1968, § 102 (adding 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)). 
Those crimes, and some other set of violent crimes, would not have involved regulation of 
business practices, and could not have been excluded by Executive Branch action. 
60   E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16–11–131(b), (d) (Westlaw through Laws 2020, Act 322) 
(prohibition for one “who has been convicted of a felony by a court of this state or any other 
state; by a court of the United States including its territories, possessions, and dominions; 
or by a court of any foreign nation,” but providing a restoration procedure where the 
predicate crime was an antitrust, etc., violation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 129C 
(Westlaw through Ch. 44 of the 2020 2d Ann. Sess.) (criminalizing firearms possession by 
one not possessing a firearm identification card, subject to various exceptions); id. 
§ 129B(1)(i), (ii) (prohibiting issuance of firearm identification card to person with prior 
felony conviction, whether under federal, Massachusetts or other state jurisdiction); id. ch. 
269, § 10(h) (setting punishment for firearms possession absent compliance with § 129C); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.713.1(10)(i) (Westlaw through legislation effective through Apr. 18, 
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committed in-state)61—so a state felon firearm ban may be broader than 
the federal one. However, a state ban may not be permanent62 or may have 
some complex nuance.63 
Assessment of the constitutionality of the federal felon prohibition on 
firearms possession requires one keep in mind certain basic principles 
underlying heightened levels of constitutional scrutiny. The presence of a 
mismatch between the objective of a restriction on a constitutional right 
and the means used raises concerns that the restriction reflects proscribed 
hostility to the right, as opposed to advancing the putative interest; the 
mismatch urges against its constitutionality.64 The current federal ban, 
 
2020); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.360(1)(b) (Westlaw through 80th Reg. Sess. (2019)) 
(expressly referencing felonies under the laws of another state or the United States); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2–308.2(A) (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. and 2020 Reg. Sess, cc. 1, 64, 
198, 201, 202, 247, 249, 255, 278, 356, 478, 603, 620, 659, 660, 701, 808, 831, 941, 1093, 
1200, 1202, 1220, 1231, 1234 & 1272) (providing prohibition arising from any felony, 
expressly referencing crimes in other states and under federal law, but providing 
restoration procedure). 
61   MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.070.1(1) (Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. and 1st Extra. 
Sess. of the 100th Gen. Assembly) (criminalizing firearms possession by one “convicted of a 
felony under the laws of this state, or of a crime under the laws of any state or of the 
United States which, if committed within this state, would be a felony”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
941.29(1m)(b) (Westlaw through 2019 Act 186) (referencing conviction "of a crime 
elsewhere that would be a felony if committed in this state”); State v. Campbell, 642 
N.W.2d 230, 232–33 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that although the predicate crime in Ohio 
involved acts within Wisconsin’s corresponding felony, although the Ohio statute omitted 
an element in the corresponding Wisconsin statutory felony; holding the predicate crime 
prohibited firearms possession). See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1(A) (Westlaw 
through the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting firearms possession by a person convicted of 
assorted Louisiana crimes or a person “who has been convicted under the laws of any other 
state or of the United States or of any foreign government or country of a crime which, if 
committed in this state, would be one of the above-enumerated crimes”).  
Other anomalies arise from a conviction in one state creating a prohibition in another 
state. In Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 2017), the complainant previously had 
“his civil rights restored by the Governor of Virginia and his firearms rights restored by the 
Virginia courts.” Id. at 617. Hamilton validates Maryland’s determination that the 
conviction continued to result in a Maryland prohibition, until such time as the Virginia 
Governor provided the complainant a “full pardon.” Id. at 628. Similar issues are presented 
in Moran v. Wisconsin Department of Justice, 932 N.W.2d 430, 443–34, 436 (Wisc. Ct. App. 
2019) (reaching a similar conclusion as to a Wisconsin prohibition). 
62   E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.200(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (Westlaw through ch. 31, 2020 2d 
Reg. Sess.) (providing felon prohibition ends 10 years after “unconditional discharge on the 
prior offense,” excluding homicide convictions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30–7–16(A)(1), (D)(3) 
(Westlaw through laws in effect through May 20, 2020) (providing felon prohibition lasting 
ten years from later of completion of sentence or probation); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 166.270(1), (4)(a) (Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.) (excluding most convictions upon 15 
years after imprisonment, parole or probation). 
63   E.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a) (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) 
(permanent ban from felony conviction, except for possession at “the premises at which the 
person lives” at least five years following release from confinement or, if later, release from 
supervision or parole). 
64   In discussing strict scrutiny, Peter Rubin notes: 
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disarming some nonviolent offenders, but not visiting the harsh 
consequences on select white-collar criminals, reflects that form of dubious 
mismatch. 
III. REPRESENTATIVE OUTCOMES IN CONTEMPORARY SECOND AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGES TO THE FELON BAN 
A typical contemporary treatment of as-applied challenges to felon 
firearms possession involves a two-step process.65 In the first step, the 
court determines whether the individual is within the scope of the 
protection of the Second Amendment. A misdemeanor conviction may be 
deemed “serious” for this purpose.66 
At this stage, a court may frame the issue as the Second Amendment’s 
protection only extending to the virtuous.67 So, at this step, a court may 
 
[T]he inquiry into narrow tailoring—into the fit between classification and 
proffered goal—serves at least three distinct purposes. First, it ensures that the 
stated purpose was indeed the actual purpose behind the classification. A narrow 
tailoring inquiry can help to “smoke out” illegitimate purposes by demonstrating 
that the classification does not, in fact, serve the stated, legitimate purpose.”  
Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict 
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 14 (2000) (citing City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
65   See, e.g., Binderup v. Att. Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 346–47 (3d Cir. 2016) (plurality 
opinion) (citations omitted) (“At step one of the Marzzarella decision tree, a challenger 
must prove . . . that a presumptively lawful regulation burdens his Second Amendment 
rights. This requires a challenger to clear two hurdles: he must (1) identify the traditional 
justifications for excluding from Second Amendment protections the class of which he 
appears to be a member, and then (2) present facts about himself and his background that 
distinguish his circumstances from those of persons in the historically barred class.” (citing 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010)). See generally David B. Kopel & 
Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 193, 227–28 (2017) (collecting cases). 
66   See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
67   Binderup v. Attorney General United States, 836 F.3d 336, 348–49 (3d Cir. 2016), 
states: 
“[M]ost scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was 
tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government 
could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’ ” Several of our sister circuits endorse the 
“virtuous citizen” justification for excluding felons and felon-equivalents from the 
Second Amendment's ambit. 
People who have committed or are likely to commit “violent offenses”—crimes “in 
which violence (actual or attempted) is an element of the offense,”—undoubtedly 
qualify as “unvirtuous citizens” who lack Second Amendment rights. But Heller 
recognized “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” not 
just violent felons. The category of “unvirtuous citizens” is thus broader than violent 
criminals; it covers any person who has committed a serious criminal offense, violent 
or nonviolent. To the extent Barton suggests that people who commit serious crimes 
retain or regain their Second Amendment rights if they are not likely to commit a 
violent crime, it is overruled.  
Id. at 348–49 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. 
Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010); then quoting United States v. Skoien, 614 
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conclude that a prior serious conviction puts the individual outside the 
protection of the Second Amendment.68  
If the claimant is not within the protection of the Second Amendment, 
any subsequent review will be under a highly deferential approach such as 
a rational basis test.69 This may be the case, even if the claimant 
thereafter led an exemplary life.70  
Otherwise, in the second step, the court needs to ascertain the 
standard of review—because the Supreme Court has not settled on a 
standard of review.71 And, of course, it would need to apply that standard. 
Some federal circuits allow as-applied challenges by persons subject to 
the felon firearms ban in section 922(g)(1);72 others do not. The Seventh 
Circuit noted in 2019: 
Relying on the “presumptively lawful” language in Heller and 
McDonald, every federal court of appeals to address the issue has 
held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment on 
its face.  
However, courts of appeals are split as to whether as-applied 
Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are viable. On the 
one hand, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have suggested that § 922(g)(1) is always constitutional as applied 
to felons as a class, regardless of their individual circumstances or 
the nature of their offenses. 
The First Circuit has not foreclosed as-applied challenges, but 
it has expressed some skepticism about them. . . . 
 
F.3d 638, 640, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); then quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)) (citing United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2011), 
overruled by Binderup, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016)). 
68   But see Barton, 633 F.3d at 174 (stating, “Similarly, a court might find that a felon 
whose crime of conviction is decades-old poses no continuing threat to society. The North 
Carolina Supreme Court did just that in Britt v. State, 363 N.C. 546, 681 S.E.2d 320 
(2009), finding that a felon convicted in 1979 of one count of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute had a constitutional right to keep and bear arms, at 
least as that right is understood under the North Carolina Constitution.”), overruled by 
Binderup, 836 F.3d 336. 
69   E.g., Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. 
Medina v. Barr, No. 19–287, 2019 WL 6689673 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2019). 
70   E.g., Medina, 913 F.3d 152, 160–61 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“A prohibition on firearm 
ownership, like these other disabilities, is a reasonable consequence of a felony conviction 
that the legislature is entitled to impose without undertaking the painstaking case-by-case 
assessment of a felon’s potential rehabilitation.”). 
71   District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (noting the dissent 
“criticizes us for declining to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment 
restrictions”). 
72   18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91). 
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On the other hand, we, along with the Fourth, Eighth, and 
D.C. Circuits, have left room for as-applied challenges to the 
statute.73 
Federal courts within the Third Circuit have at times seemed 
relatively aggressive in reviewing bans arising from prior convictions. The 
en banc decision in Binderup v. Attorney General United States74 gave rise 
to a fractured analysis set forth in three opinions: an opinion announcing 
the judgment of the court,75 a concurrence in part and in the judgment,76 
and a concurrence in part and a dissent in part.77 The opinion announcing 
the judgment concludes an individual can, in an as-applied claim, 
demonstrate a state misdemeanor triggering the federal possession ban is 
not sufficiently serious to put him or her outside the protection of the 
Second Amendment.78 
Binderup addresses certain convictions treated as misdemeanors 
under state law but punishable by more than two years. In the opinion 
announcing the court’s judgment, the court finds the individuals 
demonstrated they had not been convicted of “serious crimes.” Hence, they 
had adequately demonstrated they were not in the class of “persons 
historically excluded from the right to arms.”79 
Where courts have allowed as-applied challenges for disqualifications 
arising from crimes deemed less serious, a not uncommon view would treat 
a serious offense as permanent stain—one that cannot be cleansed by 
subsequent honorable conduct. For example, Tripodi v. Sessions80 states, 
“As a result, ‘the passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation’ will not 
‘restore the Second Amendment rights of people who committed serious 
crimes.’ Any allegations regarding the age of the conviction or the 
offender's rehabilitation are thus irrelevant to our analysis.”81 
A few cases hold that the statutory disqualifications from firearms 
possession either (i) are unconstitutional, as applied, or (ii) adequately 
alleged a constitutional violation. We can provide a few illustrations. 
Courts have held there were adequate allegations of a Second Amendment 
violation arising from prohibitions for:  
 
73   Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 442–43 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). 
74   836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
75   Binderup, 836 F.3d at 339 (Ambro, J.) (announcing the judgment of the court). 
76   Binderup, 836 F.3d at 357 (Hardiman, J.) (concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (joined by four other judges). 
77   Binderup, 836 F.3d at 380 (Fuentes, J.) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(joined by six other judges). 
78   Binderup, 836 F.3d at 349, 351–52 (Ambro, J.) (announcing the judgment of the 
court). 
79   Binderup, 836 F.3d at 353 (Ambro, J.) (announcing the judgment of the court). 
80   339 F. Supp. 3d 458 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
81   Tripodi, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 463 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (footnote omitted) (quoting Binderup, 
836 F.3d at 349 (plurality opinion)). 
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(i) a conviction for driving under the influence, having a 2-1/2 year 
a maximum possible sentence;82 and 
(ii) possession of a short-barreled shotgun whose barrel had been 
shortened after having been damaged.83  
Courts have held it unconstitutional to found a permanent federal 
firearms prohibition on the following predicate crimes:84 
(i) a guilty plea, made eighteen years prior, to corrupting a minor, 
arising from a consensual sexual relationship with a 17-year-old 
employee (a misdemeanor punishable by up to five years);85  
(ii) a stale (26-year-old) state misdemeanor conviction for 
unlawfully carrying a handgun without a license (punishable by up to 
three years), against a person now holding a “Secret” federal 
government security clearance in connection with his job as a 
consultant for a government contractor;86  
(iii) a correction officer’s predicate state misdemeanor conviction 
for carrying an unlicensed firearm;87 and 
(iv) a misdemeanor conviction for alteration of documentation 
allowing car window tint, so as to make it appear to apply it to a 
different vehicle.88 
There are, however, recent cases less charitable in treating requests 
for reinstatement following a stale adverse mental health determination89 
 
82   Baginski v. Lynch, 229 F. Supp.3d 48, 49, 57 (D.D.C. 2017) (denying summary 
judgment for the government). 
83   Robinson v. Lynch, No. 2:16–CV–00150–DB–EJF, 2017 WL 1131896, at *2 (D. Utah 
Mar. 24, 2017) (“The Court finds Mr. Robinson’s proposed Amended Complaint pleads 
particular facts likely making plausible his claim that § 922(g)(1), as applied to the 
‘severable subcategory of persons’ to which Mr. Robinson belongs, deprived Mr. Robinson of 
his constitutional rights.”); First Amended Complaint at 3–4, Robinson, No. 2:16–CV–
00150–DB–EJF, 2017 WL 1131896 (D. Utah Mar. 24, 2017) (identifying predicate crime as 
involving conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun, whose barrel had been 
shortened after having been damaged). 
84   We are here examining the ban arising from prior criminal convictions. We are not 
detailing challenges to other bans, e.g., arising from a prior determination of mental 
incapacity. E.g., Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 706–08, 720 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (holding 
unconstitutional a ban arising from an eight-day involuntary commitment, at the age of 15 
precipitated by the divorce of the claimant’s parents, of an Army veteran now a correctional 
officer whose employment involves carrying a firearm). See also Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 681, 683, 699 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (lead opinion) (holding 
there were adequate allegations of a Second Amendment violation arising from a 
prohibition based on a two- to four-week commitment, thirty years prior, after a divorce). 
85   Binderup, 836 F.3d at 340, 356–57 (Ambro, J.) (announcing the judgment of the 
court). 
86   Id. at 340, 356–57. 
87   Clark v. Sessions, 336 F. Supp. 3d 535, 538, 542, 545 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (crime 
punishable by up to five years incarceration).  
88   Miller v. Sessions, 356 F. Supp. 3d 472, 476, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2019). 
89   E.g., Simpson v. Sessions, Civil Action No. 16–1334, 2017 WL 1910141, at *1, *6 
(E.D. Pa. May 10, 2017) (stating in dismissing claims seeking injunctive relief by a person 
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or challenging a ban arising from conviction for particular crimes.90 
Illustrative recent circumstances arose from: 
(i) a prior federal felony conviction for misprision of felony;91 
(ii) a twenty-seven-year-old federal felony conviction for “making a 
false statement to a lending institution,” in connection with applying 
for a $30,000 loan;92 
(iii) a federal felony conviction for making a false statement in a 
matter within the jurisdiction of the Executive Branch, involving a 
false claim on forms for unemployment insurance and omission of 53 
days of actual work, resulting in the wrongful receipt of $1,628;93 
(iv) a state misdemeanor conviction for driving under the 
influence (treating the misdemeanor as “serious” and holding the 
challenge failed at the first step);94 
(v) a federal felony conviction for fraud arising from sale of foot 
inserts falsely described as meeting Medicare thickness requirements 
(based on application of the second step of the analysis, eliding 
application of the first step);95 
 
involuntarily committed for two days, fifteen years prior, “[T]he passage of time is 
immaterial to the analysis in this matter. There is no exception to § 922(g)(4) for the 
passage of time.”).  
90   Dave Kopel and Joseph Greenlee state, “No convicted violent felon has succeeded in 
an as-applied challenge to the federal statute.” Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 65, at 226. 
91   United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171, 1173–75 (9th Cir. 2016). 
92   Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 154, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (stating, “[W]e hold 
that those convicted of felonies are not among those entitled to possess arms,” and “[The 
claimant] argues that an examination of his ‘present, complete character’ places him back 
within the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’ We disagree.”), cert. denied sub nom. 
Medina v. Barr, No. 19–287, 2019 WL 6689673 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2019). 
93   Hatfield v. Barr, 925 F.3d 950, 951–53 (7th Cir. 2019); Hatfield v. Sessions, 322 F. 
Supp. 3d 885, 887 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (identifying the number of days), rev’d sub nom. Hatfield 
v. Barr, 925 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2019). 
94   Holloway v. Att. Gen. U.S., 948 F.3d 164, 173, 177–78 (3d Cir. 2020) (stating “that 
Holloway’s DUI conviction constitutes a serious crime, placing him within the class of 
‘persons historically excluded from Second Amendment protections.’ Because Holloway has 
not met his burden at the first step of the analysis to overcome the presumptive application 
of § 922(g)(1), § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to him, and he is not entitled to relief.” 
(plurality opinion) (footnote omitted) (quoting Binderup v. Att. Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 347 
(3d Cir. 2016)); see also Williams v. Barr, 379 F. Supp. 3d 360, 364, 380 (E.D. Pa. 2019) 
(stating, “The statistical evidence shows that individuals convicted of an alcohol-related 
offense have a four to five-fold increase of being arrested for a crime of violence or firearm-
related offense, as compared to individuals with no prior criminal history.”); State v. 
Culver, 918 N.W.2d 103, 106, 115 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018) (addressing a felony predicate 
offense), review denied, 923 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 2019). 
95   Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 438, 440, 447, 451 (7th Cir. 2019) (applying the second 
step of the analysis without deciding whether the predicate felony resulted in the challenge 
failing the first step). 
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(vi) a ten-year-old guilty plea to a state misdemeanor for theft of 
two saws worth a total of $1,900, which was punishable by up to five 
years incarceration, holding the challenge failed at the first step;96 
(vii) a seven-year-old federal felony conviction for filing a false tax 
return, for which the individual had made a $257,796.39 restitution 
payment, holding the challenge failed at the first step;97 and 
(viii) a guilty plea to a state felony for tampering with state 
records, punishable by up to seven years imprisonment, arising from 
overbilling the state in operation of a funeral business and failure to 
forward reimbursements and ultimately resulting in payment of 
$7,125 in restitution.98 
IV. FOUNDING-ERA CONCEPTUALIZATION LIMITING CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS TO THE VIRTUOUS 
This Part briefly summarizes the relationship between the need for a 
virtuous citizenry and the broad contours of the governance structure 
envisioned by the founders. Our summary yields the following conclusions: 
There was an appreciation for a need for a “virtuous” citizenry. But 
“virtuous” in this context had a different connotation from the 
contemporary one. It contemplated participation in governance, 
sublimating personal interests to the needs of the public.  
Suzanna Sherry has written, “Eighteenth century Americans believed 
that their experiment with liberty would stand or fall on the civic virtue of 
the citizenry.”99 She provides an introductory description of “civic virtue” 
as “a general picture of citizens who are willing and able to participate in 
the public life of their community and their nation.”100 Sherry wryly 
illustrates the divergence between the connotation of a “virtuous” citizen 
 
96   Baumiller v. Sessions, 371 F. Supp. 3d 224, 228, 233 (W.D. Pa. 2019). 
97   Folajtar v. Barr, 369 F. Supp. 3d 617, 618–19 & n.4, 622, 624 (E.D. Pa. 2019). 
98   United States v. Irving, 316 F. Supp. 3d 879, 882–883, 888, 893 (E.D. Pa. 2018) 
(stating, “[A]s a felon convicted of a serious crime, Hunt Irving fell outside the protection of 
the Second Amendment . . . .”), appeal filed sub nom. United States v. Hunt-Irving, No. 19–
1636 (3d Cir. Mar. 25, 2019). 
99   Suzanna Sherry, “Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty,” 78 MINN. L. REV. 61, 68 
(1993). 
100   Sherry, supra note 99, at 68. Sherry elaborates as follows: 
When eighteenth century Americans spoke of virtue, they invoked several 
intertwined ideas, all of which stemmed from the classical tradition of political 
participation as the highest human good. Responsibility, independence and 
community spirit are some of the modern concepts that come closest to capturing the 
meaning of civic virtue. A virtuous citizen had an independent mind and a 
willingness to use it for the good of the community. Virtue meant taking 
responsibility for oneself and one’s community. Virtue also meant letting reason 
control passion, letting long-term community interests override selfish individual 
wants. Citizens in a virtuous republic deliberated rationally about what would best 
serve the interests of the community. 
Id. at 69. 
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in the era of the Revolutionary War and in modern times. She writes, “One 
of my colleagues snickered when he first heard the title of this speech; he 
assumed that ‘virtue’ was used in its predominant modern sense of sexual 
chastity. In the eighteenth century, however, ‘virtue’ meant something 
quite different.”101  
Some of Sherry’s Founding-Era illustrations include: “Samuel Adams 
wrote that men ‘will be free no longer than while they remain virtuous.’ 
His cousin and political opposite, John Adams, said that ‘public Virtue is 
the only Foundation of Republics.’”102 Stephen Feldman has written: 
Under republican democracy, citizens and elected officials were 
supposed to be virtuous; in the political realm, they were to 
pursue the common good or public welfare rather than their own 
partial or private interests. When citizens or officials used 
government institutions to pursue their own interests, then the 
government was corrupt.103 
Academic commentary long ago focused on the relationship between 
this need for a virtuous citizenry and the Second Amendment.104 David 
Williams, for example, notes “Service in the militia trained one to a life of 
virtue, both self-sacrificing and independent . . . . “105 He further notes, 
“Colonial records are full of complaints that the militia, reflecting the 
sentiment of the people, refused to enforce edicts perceived as unjust, or 
even participated in popular resistance to them. Colonial culture accepted 
some measure of violent resistance as a normal part of life, although those 
in authority never ceased to complain of that fact.”106 
A need for a particular form of militia participation is, of course, a 
separate matter from whether a class of certain persons—persons deemed 
not virtuous—would be permanently disarmed. To say that one class of 
 
101   Sherry, supra note 99, at 69. 
102   Id. at (footnote omitted) (first quoting Letter from Samuel Adams to John Scollay 
(Dec. 30, 1780), in 4 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 236, 238 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 
1908); then quoting Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (April 16, 1776), in 1 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 670 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)). 
103   Stephen M. Feldman, The End of the Cold War: Can American Constitutionalism 
Survive Victory?, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261, 264 (2015) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., 
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 155–56 (1987) (discussing “civic virtue” as “an important concern 
in political theory both before and during the framing of our constitution”); Alan Hirsch, 
Direct Democracy and Civic Maturation, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 191 (2002) (“In 
Federalist 55, [Madison] reiterated that republican government presupposes ‘sufficient 
virtue among men for self-government.’ ” (quoting The Federalist No. 55, at 346 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
104   E.g., David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The 
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE. L.J. 551 (1991); see also infra notes 120–124 and 
accompanying text. 
105   Id. at 556. 
106   Id. at 581 (footnote omitted). 
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persons is needed to engage in some activity says nothing about the 
propriety of treating the complementary class of persons in a particular 
way. In the immediately following Part V, we illuminate that, in fact, the 
Founding-Era treatment of those one might categorize as “non-virtuous,” 
on account of some prior conviction for serious crimes, were not inherently 
subject to permanent firearms bans. 
V. THE ABSENCE OF A FOUNDING-ERA ANALOGUE 
Other works have addressed certain aspects of the collateral 
consequences, in the Founding Era, of the commission of a felony, as that 
term was then used. The purpose of this Part is not to attempt to provide a 
comprehensive treatment of that historical context. Rather, the core of this 
article is to address the contemporary treatment of the rights of persons 
classified as not virtuous, and to put in context assertions that the 
Founding-Era treatment of the non-virtuous mandates that there is an 
implicit restriction appended to the Second Amendment, by which all who 
have committed felonies are excluded. Our presentation of perspectives 
from centuries ago is limited to providing the backdrop necessary to 
contextualize our core investigation.  
Subpart A notes the link identified in some contemporary 
jurisprudence that ties benefit under the Second Amendment to being 
virtuous. The seminal is analysis in some late twentieth-century 
scholarship by Don Kates. Subpart B illuminates the logical fallacy in 
finding the Founding-Era’s perception of a need for a virtuous citizenry to 
man the militia implies some adverse treatment of “non-virtuous” citizens 
was mandated. The discredited view does not demonstrate non-virtuous 
persons were permanently disarmed, and it is inconsistent with Heller’s 
acknowledgement that benefit from the Second Amendment is decoupled 
from militia service.  
Subpart C reveals that broad validation of felon firearms bans reflects 
an erroneous understanding of the Founding-Era consequences of 
forfeiture associated with commission of capital crimes. Subpart D shows 
the historical record on which the relevant cases rely is a disingenuously 
curated selection of Founding-Era authority. Subpart E shows the 
Founding-Era analogues restricting the activity of dangerous persons were 
not broad, generic, class-wide prohibitions untethered to the disarmed 
person’s propensity to commit unlawful violence. Rather, those analogues 
contemplated tailoring.  
Subpart F expands on the well-known dissonance between 
contemporary over-criminalization and what might have given rise to a 
Founding-Era restriction on firearms possession. It provides an 
illustration of activity, in which a most prominent founder participated, 
that modernly could give rise to a permanent firearms ban.  
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A. Modern Cases and the Authority on Which They Rely 
The opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller,107 ancillary to its 
recognition of the right to bear arms as an individual right,108 provides 
dicta addressing felon disenfranchisement. It states, “[N]othing in our 
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.”109 A footnote indicates these longstanding 
prohibitions are merely presumptively lawful.110  
Kevin Marshall notes that the Heller dicta concerning “longstanding” 
bans relies on gossamer authority.111 The Court did not endeavor to detail 
the nexus between that dicta and Founding-Era firearms restrictions. The 
above quote is preceded by the phrase, “[a]lthough we do not undertake an 
exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second 
Amendment,”112 and the majority opinion makes few references to felons or 
felonies.113  
The term “longstanding” appears to have been used in the Heller 
opinion simply for purposes of providing a consciously imprecise reference 
to a class of restrictions that were vaguely termed as “presumptively 
lawful.” The discussion is not in the language of a rule or a standard. That 
 
107   554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
108   Id. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that 
the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”). 
109   Id. at 626–27. 
110   Id. at 627 n. 26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only 
as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”).  
111   Marshall, supra note 22, at 696–97. 
The core of this article is an examination of the unsuitability of referencing whether 
persons are “virtuous” as a basis for allowing them to be permanently disarmed. 
Affirmatively stating the suitable contours of Second Amendment protection is a much 
wider undertaking and beyond the scope of this article. Lund cogently notes a starting-off 
point for such an investigation (although one might seek change the emphasis of the 
sources of identified purposes to emphasize the text and other objective sources): “When the 
text does not supply an adequately precise answer, a conscientiously originalist court has 
no choice but to decide the issue in light of the purpose of the provision as that purpose was 
understood by those who adopted it. This is not an algorithm . . . .” Nelson Lund, The 
Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1372 
(2009). 
112   Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
113   The character string “felon” appears only four times in the majority opinion. In 
addition to the above reference, the opinion: 
• references the Heller claimant receiving a license, upon success in the litigation, 
“if he is not a felon and is not insane;” Heller, 554 U.S. at 631; and 
• twice, in discussing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), describes “an 
appeal from a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm,” Heller, 554 
U.S. at 625 n.25, accompanied by a note that in Lewis, “The challenge was based 
on the contention that the prior felony conviction had been unconstitutional.” Id. 
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the dicta does not provide a rule, or even a governing standard, is 
elucidated by the incongruity of concluding that a practice is constitutional 
merely because it has been practiced for some decades, i.e., it is 
“longstanding.”114 
Lower courts have attempted to shore up the doctrinal foundation of 
concluding felon disarmament is constitutional by referencing restricting 
constitutional rights to the virtuous. Although a few earlier cases 
referenced the “virtuous” in sketching the contours of the scope of firearms 
rights,115 at least based on citation tallies,116 reliance on this theory gained 
prominence in the contemporary Second Amendment with United States v. 
Vongxay.117 The conclusions seem driven in large measure by reference to 
a sketch of Founding-Era perspectives on firearms rights that is 
 
114   E.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“It would 
be weird to say that § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional in 2010 but will become constitutional 
by 2043, when it will be as ‘longstanding’ as § 922(g)(1) was when the Court decided 
Heller.”). See also id. at 640 (“The opinion is not a comprehensive code; it is just an 
explanation for the Court’s disposition. Judicial opinions must not be confused with 
statutes, and general expressions must be read in light of the subject under 
consideration.”). 
115    The first reported opinion involving firearms rights including the terms “virtuous” 
and “second amendment” is State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9 (W. Va. 1891). The case involves a 
statute criminalizing the carrying of a revolver (or certain other dangerous weapons, not 
including rifles) outside his or her place of dwelling. Id. at 9 (reproduced in court-written 
syllabus). The statute did not criminalize public possession in transit to or from a place for 
repairing the arm. Id. The statute also provided a defense for a person the jury finds “a 
quiet and peaceable citizen, of good character and standing in the community in which he 
lives, [where] . . . he had good cause to believe . . . that he was in danger of death or great 
bodily harm at the hands of another person, and that he was in good faith, carrying such 
weapon for self-defense and for no other purpose.” Id. 
The opinion construes the statute non-literally. As part of apparently discussing the 
constitutionality of the restriction, in light of “discrimination . . . between classes,” the 
court indicates that a person without good character, although not benefitting from a 
“statutory” defense, “is left in the hands of the jury, under full protection of the common 
law and the constitution.” Id. at 11. As to this issue, the court concludes, “This is a 
discrimination, it is true, between classes; but it is only a discrimination in favor of the 
virtuous class against the dangerous and vicious.” Id. 
116   A Westlaw search “adv: virtuous & “second Amendment,” sorted by Westlaw by 
“Most cited,” lists fourth United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). Only one 
of the three more-cited cases, United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir. 
2009), predates Vongxay, and the Westlaw citation statistics suggest it is oft-cited for its 
Fourth Amendment analysis. As of May 25, 2020, Westlaw reported 89 citing references to 
McCane being to a headnote with a heading “Arrests and Stops,” out of only 148. 
A second competitor for most prominently cited initial authority on this matter, United 
States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010), relies Vongxay:  
Whatever the pedigree of the rule against even nonviolent felons possessing 
weapons (which was codified in federal law in 1938), most scholars of the Second 
Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous 
citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm “unvirtuous citizens.”  
Yancey, 621 F.3d at 684–85 (citing Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118). 
117   594 F.3d at 1118. 
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incomplete and ultimately off-point. The basic contours of the approaches 
these courts take are: 
• First, the perceived need in the Founding Era for a virtuous 
citizenry arose from the need for an adequate militia.  
However, omitted from these cases is dispositive evidence that, 
in the Founding Era, the general class of persons previously 
convicted of serious crimes, following any confinement, were 
actually disarmed in perpetuity. 
• Second, the consequences of civil death, arising from conviction of a 
capital crime, involved forfeiture of assets.118  
That, of course, does not speak to an ongoing forfeiture of arms, 
or a prohibition on their possession, after any initial forfeiture and 
any period of confinement for a person who, in the Founding Era, 
was not subject to capital punishment.119 
We shall first examine Vongxay, as well as some other contemporary 
authority, then examine the authority on which this strand of caselaw 
relies, and then address omitted information.  
In Vongxay, the court, in part quoting Don Kates, states: 
Finally, we observe that most scholars of the Second 
Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was “inextricably 
. . . tied to” the concept of a “virtuous citizen[ry]” that would 
protect society through “defensive use of arms against criminals, 
oppressive officials, and foreign enemies alike,” and that “the 
right to bear arms does not preclude laws disarming the 
unvirtuous citizens (i.e. criminals) . . . .” We recognize, however, 
that the historical question has not been definitively resolved.120 
 
118   See, e.g., infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
119   See generally Marshall, supra note 22, at 715 (stating, as to one’s being obligated to 
forfeit property at a particular time, “But it did not follow that one could not thereafter 
purchase and hold new personal property—including a gun.”). 
120   Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Kates, supra note 9, at 146) 
(citing, inter alia, Marshall, supra note 22, at 714–28, and providing the following 
parenthetical summary of this portion of Marshall’s discussion: “maintaining that bans on 
felon gun possession are neither long-standing nor supported by common law in the 
founding era”). In the article written by Kates that the court quotes, Kates further writes: 
In classical republican political philosophy, the concept of a right to arms was 
inextricably and multifariously tied to that of the “virtuous citizen.” Free and 
republican institutions were believed to be dependent upon civic virtu which, in 
turn, depended upon each citizen being armed—and, therefore, fearless, self-reliant, 
and upright. . . . One implication of this emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the 
right to arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e., 
criminals) or those who, like children or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed 
incapable of virtue. 
Kates, supra note 9, at 146. 
  
 26 Barondes-firearms-virtuous-accepted.docx 
Reliance on this approach is common.121 A recent opinion from the 
D.C. Circuit conforms to this approach, with increased verbosity that 
continues to elide providing actual evidence of permanent, broad 
disarmament, post-sentence, of persons who had committed serious crimes 
in the Founding Era.122 
Let us turn to what is provided in Kates’ seminal academic works, on 
which Vongxay relies.123 Kates had written: 
In classical republican political philosophy, the concept of a 
right to arms was inextricably and multifariously tied to that of 
the “virtuous citizen.” Free and republican institutions were 
 
Marshall identifies pre-Heller authority led astray by academic misreading of the 
historical traditions. Marshall describes United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 226 n.21 
(5th Cir. 2001), as relying on a law review article that conflates historical restrictions on 
voting, recognized in a 1903 treatise, with restrictions on firearms. Marshall, supra note 
22, at 709. 
121   See Binderup v. Att. Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 348 (3d Cir. 2016) (plurality opinion) 
(stating, “Several of our sister circuits endorse the ‘virtuous citizen’ justification for 
excluding felons and felon-equivalents from the Second Amendment’s ambit. . . . People 
who have committed or are likely to commit ‘violent offenses’—crimes ‘in which violence 
(actual or attempted) is an element of the offense,’—undoubtedly qualify as ‘unvirtuous 
citizens’ who lack Second Amendment rights.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).  
122   Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Medina v. 
Barr, 140 S. Ct. 645 (2019), states: 
A number of other circuits have also considered this issue and have concluded 
that history and tradition support the disarmament of those who were not (or could 
not be) virtuous members of the community. At least four circuits have endorsed the 
view that “most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear 
arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the 
government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’ ” The “virtuous citizen” theory is 
drawn from “classical republican political philosophy” and stresses that the “right to 
arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals) or those who, 
like children or the mentally imbalanced, are deemed incapable of virtue.” Several 
circuits have relied on this theory to uphold the constitutionality of modern laws 
banning the possession of firearms by illegal aliens and juveniles—classes of people 
who might otherwise show, on a case-by-case basis, that they are not particularly 
dangerous. In considering these decisions, we recognize that there is “an ongoing 
debate among historians about the extent to which the right to bear arms in the 
founding period turned on concerns about the possessor’s virtue.” While we need not 
accept this theory outright, its support among courts and scholars serves as 
persuasive evidence that the scope of the Second Amendment was understood to 
exclude more than just individually identifiable dangerous individuals. 
. . . 
On balance, the historical evidence and the Supreme Court’s discussion of felon 
disarmament laws leads us to reject the argument that non-dangerous felons have a 
right to bear arms. 
Id. at 159 (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 
(7th Cir. 2010); then quoting United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Reynolds, supra note 9, at 480); then quoting Rene E., 583 F.3d at 16). 
123   See supra note 120. 
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believed to be dependent upon civic virtu which, in turn, depended 
upon each citizen being armed—and, therefore, fearless, self-
reliant, and upright. . . . One implication of this emphasis on the 
virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not preclude laws 
disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e., criminals) or those who, 
like children or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed incapable of 
virtue.124 
Consider, further, the observations of Cornell and DeDino, in journal 
article body text and an accompanying footnote: 
Those seeking pardon were not robbed of a right to free speech or 
free exercise of their religion, rights indisputably associated with 
individuals. Instead, the penalties deal more with the rights and 
obligations associated with a citizen’s duty to society: 
participation in government as a political official, participation in 
the legal process as a juror, participation in the electoral process 
as a voter, and participation in the militia.139 
139 The disqualifications are also similar in nature to the sorts 
of privileges taken away regularly from convicted felons today.125 
One can assess the extent to which contemporary courts have relied 
on the relationship between the Second Amendment and a virtuous 
citizenry through a number of lenses. As a threshold matter, one might 
conclude that contemporary American society is not “virtuous,” as that 
term was used in the Founding Era; thus, the Second Amendment should 
not be the fount of contemporary rights.126 We shall pass on that 
perspective, because it is inconsistent with Heller127 and McDonald.128  
Alternatively it is apparently asserted by some that it is too 
administratively burdensome for courts to be required to make 
individualized determinations—it will produce an “avalanche of 
litigation.”129 Much as our society will not say the Fourth Amendment can 
 
124   Kates, supra note 9, at 146. Vongxay also quotes Glenn Reynolds to that effect, 
although the citation is not meaningful but, rather, a judicial echo chamber; the cite is to 
Reynolds reiterating Kates. Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Reynolds, supra note 9, at 
480). 
125   Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American 
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 508 & n.139 (2004). 
126   See generally Williams, supra note 104, at 561 (examining Wendy Brown’s 
assertion that she “cannot imagine a less appropriate appellation for the contemporary 
American Citizenry, which bears a shared commitment to almost nothing, least of all a 
common good.” (quoting Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic 
Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson’s The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE 
L.J. 661, 663 (1989)). 
127   District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
128   McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
129   Justice Stevens remarked as follows in dissenting as to applying the Second 
Amendment to the states, “[T]oday’s decision invites an avalanche of litigation that could 
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be ignored, because it enmeshes courts in constant litigation concerning 
the validity of searches, it also cannot properly state that it is satisfactory 
to deprive a class of persons broadly of their Second Amendment rights 
because requiring additional individualized evidence will give rise to a 
significant amount of litigation. This approach is also, of course, 
inconsistent with the contemporary political movement urging adoption of 
“Red-Flag Laws” creating judicial procedures for deprivation of firearms 
rights untethered to criminal convictions.130 A judiciary that the political 
process concludes has enough capacity to deprive persons of constitutional 
rights has enough capacity to restore them. 
There is a separate issue as to whether courts are competent to make 
assessments of future danger. Lawrence Rosenthal has written, “Perhaps 
only those convicted of felonies regarded as dangerous should be barred 
from possessing firearms, as some commentators have argued. This 
approach, however, would enmesh courts in the difficult predictive 
business of judging which felonies present unacceptable risk of future 
firearms-related misconduct, a type of judgment alien to the framing-era 
regime.”131 Again, the solution to the circumstance that it is difficult for a 
court to make a decision is not to eliminate broadly, in a summary process, 
a constitutional right. That mistakes may be made in some cases is not a 
reason unjustifiably to deprive other people, on a wholesale basis, of a 
constitutional right. And, as we shall see,132 Rosenthal’s last point, 
concerning that sort of judicial weighing being “alien” in the Founding 
Era, is manifestly in error. 
Rather, we shall examine the reliability and comprehensiveness of the 
authority Kates presents, and the extent to which acts that currently give 
rise to permanent firearms bans correspond to circumstances giving rise to 
firearm bans in the Founding Era. 
 
mire the federal courts in fine-grained determinations about which state and local 
regulations comport with the Heller right—the precise contours of which are far from 
pellucid—under a standard of review we have not even established.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 
904 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1128 
(10th Cir. 2015) (stating, in justifying a general rule prohibiting firearms possession on 
post office property, “Under a more nuanced or discretionary regime, problems of perceived 
unfairness or unreasonableness—and accompanying litigation—would likely multiply, not 
disappear.”). 
130   See generally Red Flag Laws:  Examining Guidelines for State Action: Hearing 
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. (2019) 3 (Statement of David B. Kopel), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kopel%20Testimony1.pdf (discussing various 
proposals and enactments, and concluding, “Nearly a third of such orders are improperly 
issued against innocent people.”). 
131   Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1218 & n.148 (footnote omitted) (providing inapt 
authority not referencing the Founding Era but, rather, difficulty in application of a 
contemporary statute). 
132   See infra Part V.E (discussing bonds). 
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B. Linking the “Virtuous” to the Need for a Militia 
Does not Demonstrate All Persons Previously Convicted of Serious 
Crimes Were Actually Disarmed. Cases linking the scope of the Second 
Amendment to the Founding-Era conceptualization of the militia and a 
virtuous citizenry, and the authority on which these cases rely, are 
founded on abstract analyses. They do not provide evidence of a 
widespread understanding in the Founding Era, evidenced by widespread 
practice throughout the land at that time, that persons with prior 
convictions were, post-sentence, subject to permanent firearms bans. It is, 
frankly astonishing a court would modernly opt to curtail an enumerated 
right based on a theoretical assessment of the underpinnings of the need 
for a militia, as conceptualized in the Founding Era, without clear, direct 
evidence that those previously convicted of serious crimes were subject to 
wholesale, permanent disarmament in the Founding Era.  
We shall below detail the actual mechanisms that were present in the 
Founding Era to address dangerous persons, post-sentence.133 As we shall 
see, those tools involved nuanced, context-specific mechanisms. They do 
not provide a basis for validating the overbroad wholesale, permanent 
prohibitions in current law. 
Separately, in the Founding Era, human life was conceptualized as a 
divine gift that the recipient was under an affirmative obligation to 
protect.134 Bearing arms for self-defense was a means for discharging this 
duty. So, relying on this view—that Founding-Era norms contemplated 
persons post-sentence ought to be broadly disarmed—would require some 
clear indication that the event giving rise to disarmament sufficiently 
 
133   See infra Part V.E. 
134   Dwight Duncan and Peter Lubin write, “To understand what Jefferson meant by 
‘inalienable rights to life [and] liberty’ we have to look to Locke’s Second Treatise.” Dwight 
G. Duncan & Peter Lubin, The Use and Abuse of History in Compassion in Dying, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 205 (1996). They continue, quoting, inter alia, a portion of Locke’s 
chapter on “The State of Nature,” to the following effect: “Every one as he is bound to 
preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully . . . .” Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 270–71 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (emphasis in original). Thomas 
McAffee and Michael Quinlan write, “In fact, speaking from a tradition that is as much 
republican as liberal, many advocates of this period referred to a duty of self-preservation 
as warranting armed resistance, as much as a right of self-defense.” Thomas B. McAffee & 
Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, 
or Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781, 842 n.201 (1997). They reference a 
Founding-Era sermon that they describe as “enjoining the people to ‘furnish themselves 
with weapons proper for their defense and learn the use of them’ [and] “arguing that ‘[m]en 
are bound to preserve their own lives,’ and refusal to act on this duty is ‘criminal in the 
sight of God.’ ” Id. (quoting Simeon Howard, A Sermon Preached to the Ancient and 
Honorable Artillery Company in Boston (1773), in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING 
THE FOUNDING ERA (1760–1805), at 185, 197, 201 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz 
eds., 1983). 
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tainted the wrongdoer’s life so that this obligation to protect it, with the 
tools available, no longer existed. 
Inconsistent with Heller, Which Rejects Linking the Second 
Amendment to Militia Service. To say that the need for a virtuous 
citizenry was linked to the need for a militia as a logical matter says 
nothing about whether those deemed “non-virtuous” can be disarmed. This 
style of thought is akin to concluding that because one reason to close a 
dwelling’s windows is to prevent rain infiltration, one need not adopt the 
crime prevention strategy of closing one’s home windows during sunny 
workdays to prevent burglaries. 
The fallacy arises from implicitly treating one purpose for the 
operative text in the Second Amendment as its sole purpose that therefore 
curtails the operative provision. Of course, controlling American 
constitutional law directly rejects cabining the Second Amendment to 
militia-related activity. Heller notes, “The prefatory clause does not 
suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued 
the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for 
self-defense and hunting.”135 And Heller directly rejected the argument, 
proffered by the District of Columbia, that the Second Amendment 
“protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with 
militia service.”136 
Relatedly, there is a manifest dissonance that would arise from this 
militia-centric conceptualization. As Heller notes, the original federal 
militia act excluded women and persons over the age of 45.137 As Jeffrey 
Giancana has noted,138 the Second Militia Act of 1792139 does not expressly 
exclude, from the militia requirement to possess arms, all persons 
 
135   District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008). 
136   Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (providing this summary of the District of Columbia’s 
position—a position the court ultimately rejects). 
137   Heller, 554 U.S. at 596 (citing An Act More Effectually to Provide for the National 
Defence by Establishing an Uniform Militia Throughout the United States, ch. 33, § 1, 1 
Stat. 271, 271 (1792) (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 246–247 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 
No. 116–91)) (confusingly referencing this act as the “first Militia Act”). In 1792, a first 
Militia Act was passed on May 2. An Act to Provide for Calling Forth the Militia to Execute 
the Laws of the Union, Suppress Insurrections and Repel Invasions, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 
(1792), repealed by An Act to Provide for Calling Forth the Militia to Execute the Laws of 
the Union, Suppress Insurrections, and Repel Invasions; and to Repeal the Act Now in 
Force for Those Purposes, ch. 36, § 10, 1 Stat. 424, 425 (1795); and a second Militia Act was 
passed on May 8. 1 Stat. 271 (1792). See, e.g., Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 
386–87 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (referencing “the second Militia Act of 1792”), aff'd sub nom. 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
138   Jeffrey Giancana, Note, The “Scourge” of Armed Check Fraud: A Constitutional 
Framework for Prohibited Possessor Laws, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 409, 416 (2018) 
(stating a mandate in the act “to purchase a firearm lacked a carved-out exemption for 
felons.”). 
139   Second Militia Act §§ 1, 2, 1 Stat. 271, 271–72. 
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previously convicted of serious crimes. It is a non-sequitur to say the 
Founding-Era conceptualization of the militia compels the conclusion that 
a class of persons (those with prior criminal convictions of some sort) do 
not benefit from an express constitutional right, when: 
(i) there is no salient evidence members of that class were excluded, on 
a wholesale basis, from the militia duties of firearms ownership; and  
(ii) it is not seriously claimed that the classes of persons who were 
expressly excluded from federal militia duties in the Founding Era (women 
and those over forty-five) do not benefit from the Second Amendment. 
Now, perhaps there was some practice, not reflected in statutory 
language, excluding criminals, post-sentence, from any and all militia 
obligation that escapes identification in contemporary judicial opinions. In 
any case, any Founding Era nexus between militia obligations and prior 
convictions was not sufficiently widespread and salient—core to the 
Founding-Era understanding of firearms rights—to compel the conclusion 
that the operative clause of the Second Amendment is subject to an 
implicit limit that, as we shall see,140 relies on a wholly discredited 
constitutional theory.  
C. Forfeiture for Capital Crime 
The relevant contemporary caselaw references the Founding-Era 
treatment of persons convicted of capital crimes. Medina v. Whitaker141 
notes, “In 1769, William Blackstone defined felony as ‘an offense which 
occasions a total forfeiture of either lands, or goods, or both, at the 
common law, and to which capital or other punishment may be 
superadded, according to the degree of guilt.’ ”142 Yet, the opinion then 
notes, “Felonies were so connected with capital punishment that it was 
‘hard to separate them.’ ”143 Notwithstanding the implicit link between 
imposition of capital punishment and forfeiture it just recognized, the 
Medina opinion proceeds to treat Founding-Era principles governing 
forfeiture as informing Founding-Era treatment of persons who were not 
given capital punishment: 
[F]elonies were—and remain—the most serious category of crime 
deemed by the legislature to reflect “grave misjudgment and 
maladjustment.” With this perspective, it is difficult to conclude 
that the public, in 1791, would have understood someone facing 
 
140   See infra Part VI. 
141   913 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Medina v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 645 
(2019). 
142   Medina, 913 F.3d at 158 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *95 
(Harper ed. 1854)). 
143   Id. (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 142, at *98).  
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death and estate forfeiture to be within the scope of those entitled 
to possess arms.144 
Missing from the opinion is articulation of a rationale why theoretical 
musings about the underpinnings of the treatment of persons sentenced to 
death in the Founding Era is sufficient to compel a conclusion concerning 
how courts should interpret a constitutional right. 
Erroneously Equating Founding-Era Capital Crimes with All Serious 
Crimes. Attributes of civil death in the Founding Era would have included 
forfeiture of assets145 and an inability to enforce contracts146 or otherwise 
to initiate litigation.147 It is not the case that in the Founding Era, all 
crimes having “serious” punishments were capital. A 1749 Massachusetts 
act imposed three years imprisonment, and other punishments, for 
anonymous extortion.148 A 1790 federal statute imposed imprisonment of 
up to seven years, and a fine or possibly other ancillary punishments, for 
conviction of numerous crimes such as: 
• misprison of treason;149  
• maliciously maiming a person “within any of the places upon the 
land under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, 
or upon the high seas, in any vessel belonging to the United States, 
or to any citizen or citizens thereof,” and150 
• destruction, etc., of records of courts of the United States.151  
Numerous other crimes were punishable under that statute by 
imprisonment for more than one year, such as: 
 
144   Medina, 913 F.3d at 158 (first quoting Will Tress, Unintended Collateral 
Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early American Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461, 
468, 473 (2009); then quoting Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir. 2017)). 
145   See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
146   See Marshall, supra note 22, at 715. 
147   E.g., 1 J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 725 (London, A.J. 
Valpy 1816) (stating “he can bring no action, nor perform any of the legal functions which 
before he was admitted to discharge”); Holmes v. King, 113 So. 274, 275 (Ala. 1927). 
148   Act of 1749, ch. 234, § 1, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE 
COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 570 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814)  
(providing the following punishment for anonymous extortion: “sitting on the gallows for 
the space of one hour, with a rope around his, her or their neck, and afterwards shall be set 
upon the pillory, in their have one of his, her or their ears cut off,” and three years of 
imprisonment while “kept to hard work,” and whipping each three months.). 
A 1711 Massachusetts act imposed for robbery “of another travelling the common road 
or highway” a punishment of six months imprisonment, “burning in the forehead or hand,” 
and treble damages; a second conviction was a capital offense. An Act for Suppressing of 
Robberies and Assaults (1711), ch. 103, § 1, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS 
OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 392, 393 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 
1814). 
149   An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 2, 
1 Stat. 112, 112 (1790) (act codified as amended in scattered sections). 
150   Id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 115. 
151   Id. § 15, 1 Stat. at 115–16.  
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• misprison of murder or other felony on the high seas or property 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States (up to 3 
years);152 
• manslaughter on property within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States (up to 3 years);153 
• confederacy to become a pirate (up to three years);154 
• perjury in the courts of the United States (up to three years);155 and 
• bribery of a federal judge (“fined and imprisoned at the discretion of 
the court”).156  
The federal statute expressly provided that a conviction for none of 
those serious crimes “shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of 
estate.”157 So, it simply was not the case that in the Founding Era, all 
serious crimes were accompanied by civil death and forfeiture of one’s 
assets.158  
These specific statutes referenced above are set forth merely for 
purposes of providing discrete, incontrovertible illustrations. One 
interested in a broader conclusion could turn to the Chitty treatise, which 
states, “[A]ll those offences which exist at common law, and have not been 
regulated by any particular statute, are within the discretion of the court 
to punish.”159 In sum, a diminished role of capital punishment arose from a 
combination of statutory revision and liberal reduction of charges by grand 
juries.160 
 
152   Id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 113. 
153   Id. § 7, 1 Stat. at 113. 
154   Id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 115. 
155   Id. § 18, 1 Stat. at 116. 
156   Id. § 21, 1 Stat. at 117. 
157   Id. § 24, 1 Stat. at 117. 
158   See also, e.g., Boardman v. Gore, 15 Mass. 331, 337 (1819) (“These reasons do not 
exist with us. There is no forfeiture of lands or goods on conviction of crimes; nor is there 
any recompense provided by the public; nor is the criminal party punished with death 
. . . .”). 
159   1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 710. 
160   See, e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6(b) (4th ed. Westlaw 
through Dec. 2019) (“As to punishment, although the colonial criminal law was harsh by 
modern standards, it was considerably less severe than English law. In part that was due 
to changes in the severity of authorized punishment, but more significant was the 
utilization of a sentencing scheme that gave officials discretionary authority to be lenient in 
order that the penalty actually imposed take account of the ‘circumstances of the criminal 
[and] not just the crime.’ Some colonies (most notably Pennsylvania) sharply reduced the 
number of offenses for which capital punishment could be imposed, but the more critical 
elements in the less frequent use of that penalty were the willingness of grand juries to 
downgrade charges to non-capital offenses, the willingness of juries similarly to convict on 
lesser offenses, liberal exercise of the power to pardon, and the ready availability of benefit 
of clergy in some colonies for first-offenders convicted of capital crimes.” (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN 
THE NEW REPUBLIC 50 (1971))); Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: 
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Forfeiture Associated with Imposition of Capital Punishment, or 
Sometimes Incarceration for Life. As a general matter, civil death was 
linked to imposition of a capital sentence.161 The chapter on civil death 
(attainder) in Chitty’s 1816 treatise on criminal law begins, “When 
sentence has been pronounced upon a criminal for a capital offense, he is 
immediately by operation of law placed in a state of attainder.”162 The text 
later states, “The word attainder is derived from the Latin term attinctus, 
signifying stained or polluted, and includes, in its meaning, all those 
disabilities which flow from a capital sentence.”163  
One can assess the nature of the nexus by noting what a Missouri 
court, in the nineteenth century, needed to reference in identifying civil 
death not linked to imposition of a capital sentence: conviction for 
supporting a foreign government, and the Pope in particular.164 
One can encounter some variation from this general principle. An 
example would be a statute providing for the administration of the estate 
of a person sentenced for life as if dead in fact.165 Another example would 
be “imprisonment for life and the loss of all the profits of his lands, with 
the forfeiture of the whole of his personal estate,” for “having rescued an 
offender from any of the superior courts.”166  
 
Understanding and Reforming Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1143, 
1168–69 (2006) (“In colonial America, many formal and informal sanctions focused 
attention on the claims that others in the community had on the offender. The most typical 
forms of punishment were fines, the posting of bond, and sureties, with shaming, corporal 
punishment, banishment, and the death penalty also employed, though less frequently.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
161   See generally Marshall, supra note 22, at 715 (stating the following generalization 
(some small adjustments to which we shall provide below, see infra notes 165–166 and 
accompanying text), “No death sentence meant no property disability.”). 
Chitty clarifies that consequences of civil death do not include forfeiture of all rights, so 
that one is transmuted into property to be trifled with at anyone’s pleasure. Chitty writes, 
“[T]he person of an attainted felon is still under the protection of the law, and therefore the 
position of Blackstone, ‘that the law takes no further care of him than barely to see him 
executed,’ must be taken with some allowance. To kill him without warrant is murder . . . .” 
1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 726 (footnotes omitted) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *380). 
162   1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 723 (first emphasis added). 
163   1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 725 (last emphasis added). 
164   Murphy & Glover Test-Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 339, 344 (1867) (“Death was not always 
the consequence of an attainder. For instance, a party attainted of a præmunire did not 
forfeit his life; death was not the penalty attached to a judgment in such cases.”). 
165   Holmes v. King, 113 So. 274, 276 (Ala. 1927) (“A statute of Missouri, declaring a 
convict sentenced for life ‘shall thereafter be deemed civilly dead,’ provides, also, for the 
administration of his estate as if dead in fact.” (quoting Williams v. Shackleford, 11 S.W. 
222, 222 (Mo. 1889)). But cf. Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. Ch. 118, 124–25 (N.Y. Ch. 1822) 
(“It seems, then, that perpetual imprisonment, or perpetual banishment without forfeiture 
of the estate, did not, in England, produce civil death, or, at least, did not devest the party 
of his estate.”). 
166   1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 707 (emphasis removed). 
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For our purposes, then, one might focus on the fact that civil death 
was typically linked to imposition of a capital sentence, although some of 
the consequences might attend a life sentence. And there might be some 
other ancillary exceptions. In any case, this variation shows that, in the 
Founding Era, forfeiture was from coextensive with commission of each 
and every “serious” crime. 
And there is authority from long ago expressly stating that forfeiture 
of rights upon a conviction did not fully extend to one no longer confined: 
“And, upon obtaining a parole, in the absence of express restrictions, he is 
restored to his liberty to go at large and to his natural right to the fruits of 
his own labor so long as he lives up to the conditions of the parole. This 
would logically carry with it the right to make contracts and to acquire 
and dispose of his own private property.”167 
American Tradition Restricted Application of Civil Death. The 
American approach did not adopt the full scope of the common law civil 
death.168 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated as to statutes providing 
for civil death arising from a felony conviction, “[T]he full significance of 
such statutes have never been enforced by our courts for the principal 
reason that they are out of harmony with the spirit of our fundamental 
laws and with other provisions of statutes.”169 Similarly, Holmes v. King 
notes, “In the absence of statute, the doctrine of ‘civil death’ has been 
generally denied in this country.”170 Chadwick v. Knox states a convict in 
prison can contract for otherwise lawful services for assistance with 
seeking a pardon—which would be inconsistent with the notion that he or 
she was, in full, civilly dead.171 
Over hundred years ago, the Oklahoma Supreme Court distinguished 
the treatment of a felon’s natural rights and other legal rights, noting a 
modern trend under which natural rights are not abridged other than by 
express statutory provision.172 Similarly, Miller v. Turner173 also 
separately treats restriction of natural rights. The court states the 
collateral consequences of a conviction do not include limits on making 
 
167   Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 139 P. 948, 950 (Okla. 1914). 
168   See Marshall, supra note 22, at 715 (stating “the[] doctrines did not carry over to 
the United States in their strict English form”). 
169   Byers, 139 P. at 949. 
170   113 So. at 275. 
171   31 N.H. 226, 235 (N.H. Super. Ct. Judicature 1855) (stating he “may employ 
another to do such acts as may be rightfully and properly done for his relief, and contract to 
pay him for his services and to repay him his expenses. Such a contract . . . is free from any 
just exception, and binding upon the parties.”). 
172   Byers, 139 P. at 949 (referencing a “modern trend . . . to extend, rather than to 
limit, those natural rights . . . except in states where they are expressly abridged by 
statute”). 
173   253 N.W. 437 (N.D. 1934). 
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contracts and maintaining actions “which concern his personal liberty and 
are based on natural rights as distinguished from legal rights.”174 
In sum, the American tradition was not one of exuberant 
implementation of the ancient regime of civil death. The American 
tradition is limited to restrictions expressly adopted by statute, 
particularly as to natural rights. Of course, the right to bear arms is 
classified as a natural right.175 Understanding the contemporary authority 
does not point to Founding Era statutes broadly imposing permanent 
firearms disabilities, post-sentence, for each and every “serious” crime, it 
is inconsistent with the American experience to say that those broad 
restrictions are engrained in the American tradition. 
The law in a colony, on the other hand, could expressly restrict 
firearms possession in identified, limited circumstances post-sentence, as 
revealed by study of an early nineteenth century compendium of 
Massachusetts law assembling acts from and after the mid-seventeenth 
century. A search of that book revealed Massachusetts acts expressly 
providing for forfeiture of arms for only a limited subset of serious crimes. 
Under a 1692 Massachusetts act, conviction of affray required the 
offender’s imprisonment “until he find sureties for the peace and good 
behavior,” and forfeiture of “his armour or weapons” as well as a potential 
fine.176 The only other remotely apt reference in that compendium of 
Massachusetts law, revealed by an electronic search, to a forfeiture and 
either “weapons” or “armour” is not specific as to those items.177 It involves 
 
174   253 N.W. at 439. 
175   E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593–94, (2008) (“Blackstone, 
whose works, we have said, ‘constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the 
founding generation,’ cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the 
fundamental rights of Englishmen. . . . It was, he said, ‘the natural right of resistance and 
self-preservation’ . . . .” (citations omitted) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 
(1999); then quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139); id. at 594 (referencing 
additional authority); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (referencing a person’s “natural 
right of self-defence, or of his constitutional right to keep and bear arms”); see United 
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (describing the Second Amendment in the 
following terms, “This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any 
manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.”). 
176   An Act for the Punishing of Criminal Offenders (1692), ch. 11, § 6, reprinted in THE 
CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 237, 
240 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814). The only other reference to “affray” in that 
compendium of Massachusetts law, as of the early Nineteenth Century, is in a 1719 act 
concerning dueling, etc., which does not reference forfeiture of weapons. Act for the 
Punishing and Preventing of Dueling (1719), ch. 131, § 1, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND 
GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 422, 422 (Boston, T.B. 
Wait & Co. 1814). 
177   According to an electronic search, a word with the stem “forfeit” appears within two 
pages of “weapon” or “weapons” or “armour” on 16 pages of that book, according to a search 
of the book in the database, The Making of Modern Law: Primary Sources, Gale Cengage 
Learning. (“Armor” does not appear.) Twelve are manifestly irrelevant to our issue, 
involving forfeiture of land, THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND 
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a 1751 act criminalizing the armed participation in rioting of twelve or 
more persons, and failure to disperse after an hour of order.178 That act 
provided for forfeiture of all one’s land and goods (“or such a part thereof 
as shall be adjudged by the justices before whom such offense shall be 
tried”), in addition to whipping and one year’s imprisonment.179 
This illustration appears to be representative. Kevin Marshall, 
apparently in connection with recounting the state of the law up to the 
publication of a 1903 treatise, writes, “The closest thing to a case 
considering a felon disability, in 1878, struck down a regulation of pistol 
carrying to the extent that it required forfeiting the offending pistol upon a 
conviction. The law did not ban the offender from obtaining a new 
pistol.”180 
Ameliorated by Benefit of Clergy. It would appear that one cannot 
assess the nature of collateral consequences of convictions for capital 
crimes without referencing the broader context. In the Founding Era, the 
harsh consequences of a conviction for a capital crime could be ameliorated 
by benefit of clergy in at least some colonies.181 This procedure, of course, 
 
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 133 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814); money, id. at 238, 
241, 340, 344, 420, 468, 469, 470, 596, 597; and goods seized by impost officers, id. at 574. 
The remaining four consist of: forfeiture of money for falsely sounding an alarm by firing a 
gun, id. at 343; a non-responsive reference to forfeiture where the reference to weapons is 
in a different act on the same page, id. at 574; the reference discussed supra note 176 and 
accompanying text; and the reference discussed infra note 178. The term “gun” or “guns” 
appears ten times, none of which is relevant. See id. at 133 (forfeiture of money for trading 
with Indians); id. at 162 (directions for mounting of artillery); id. at 163 (monetary fine for 
shooting guns in false alarm); id. at 190 (monetary fine for masters of ships or seamen 
shooting gun after daylight or on the sabbath); id. at 261 (militia ownership of guns); id. at 
266 (firing guns to sound an alarm); id. at 343 (fine for shooting gun after sunset, other 
than for an alarm or “necessary defense”); id. at 734 (providing weapons instruction for 
youths); id. at 802 (providing mandatory weapons ownership in an act for reinforcement of 
the army); id. at 804 (authorizing the paid appropriation of private arms to support the 
army). 
178   An Act for Preventing and Suppressing of Riots, Routs, and Unlawful Assemblies 
(1751), ch. 239, § 1, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND 
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 574, 575 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814).  
179   Id. According to an electronic search of the version of the text published in The 
Making of Modern Law: Primary Sources, Gale Cengage Learning (visited May 6, 2020), 
the only two references to “pistol” are in statutes involving dueling, referenced supra note 
176 and infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
180   Marshall, supra note 22, at 710–11 (footnote omitted). 
181   See, e.g., United States v. Browning, 24 F. Cas. 1276, 1277 (C.C.D.D.C. 1806) 
(describing an indictment for “stealing a tub of butter” as “charg[ing] a felony, and by the 
laws of Virginia, as they existed prior to 1796, its punishment was death, with the benefit 
of clergy”); State v. Pompey, 2 Del. Cas. 113, 113 (Quar. Sess. 1798) (summary of counsel’s 
argument stating, “I have no doubt you will from the evidence find him guilty of 
manslaughter, which crime by our Act of Assembly entitles him to benefit of clergy or Act of 
Assembly, and, if he does, the court cannot hang him, but burn in the hand and imprison 
him six months.”); State v. Gray, 5 N.C. 147, 147 (1806) (“No reason can at this day exist, 
why Females shall not be entitled to the benefit of Clergy, as well as Males.”); LAFAVE ET 
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seems bizarre from the contemporary perspective. But, in any case, it 
contemplated mitigation of the consequences of a capital conviction 
through a process involving, among other things, burning, branding or 
otherwise marking a convict’s thumb—in general, benefit of clergy was 
available only once,182 and the marking provided some evidence of 
that183—and a mitigated sentence, which could necessitate provision of a 
peace bond. For example, one opinion states, “Many persons have been 
admitted to the benefit of clergy in Maryland, and burnt in the hand 
. . . .”184 One granted benefit of clergy was subject to a range of alternative 
punishments, including, among others, imprisonment for a term, a 
requirement to post a bond for good behavior and, for convictions in 
England, “transportation”185 to colonial America or another a colony.186 
This author has searched in vain for any reference in the English 
authority Chitty to a collateral consequence involving a permanent 
forfeiture of firearms rights—or, in fact, any forfeiture of firearms rights at 
all, except as might be necessitated in order to obtain a temporary bond.187  
 
AL, supra note 160, § 1.6(b) (referencing “the ready availability of benefit of clergy in some 
colonies for first-offenders convicted of capital crimes”); Marshall, supra note 22, at 715 
(briefly discussing benefit of clergy). 
182   People v. Youngs, 1 Cai. 37, 39 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (summary of counsel’s 
argument, stating, “In England, the second conviction is not availed of in the indictment; 
but when the prisoner claims the benefit of his clergy, it is counterpleaded.” (emphasis 
removed)); 1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 675 (referencing a single use for persons not in holy 
orders; clergy allowed the benefit “as often as they may need it”). 
183   1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 669. 
184   United States v. Norris, 27 F. Cas. 187, 188 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (opinion of Cranch, 
C.J.). 
185   See generally 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 508 
(John Curwood ed., 8th ed. London, S. Sweet 1824) (stating, as to exile or transportation, 
and “send[ing] a subject of England . . . out of the land,” “After the establishment of English 
colonies in America, therefore, it became in this country, as in all others which have had 
colonies, the most common sentence of criminals.”). 
186   Chitty notes that a the end of the seventeenth century, for those granted benefit of 
clergy, “court[s] were authorized to commit the offenders to the house of correction, for any 
time not less than six months nor exceeding two years . . . .” 1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 
672. The alternatives were subsequently expanded to include for some crimes “the offender 
to be transported for seven years to America, which has been since altered to any part of 
his majesty's colonies.” Id. at 673; see generally id. at 711–15 (generally discussing the 
judicially-imposed punishments for clergyable offenses); id. at 714–15 (identifying specific 
illustrations, including in one case incarceration for a year and sureties for good behaviour 
for seven years; and, in another, imprisonment for two years, followed by an obligation to 
provide sureties for good behavior for three years, in addition to the pillory and a fine). 
187   According to an electronic search of the text using interface provided by The 
Making of Modern Law: Legal Treatises 1800-1926 database (Gale Cengage Learning), the 
book has no responsive information (no reference to forfeiture of firearms, specifically, as 
revealed by searches for pages with the words with the stem “forfeit” within 90 words of 
any word with any of the following stems: arm, firearm, musket or weapon. In specific, the 
searches were: chitty and (forfeit* n90 arm*); chitty and (forfeit* n90 firearm*); chitty and 
(forfeit* n90 gun); chitty and (forfeit* n90 musket*); chitty and (forfeit* n90 weapon*). The 
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D. Kates’ Historical Recitation Is Unpersuasive 
Above, this Part has addressed why two of the referenced snippets of 
historical conceptualizations—(i) the historical linking of a virtuous 
citizenry and the need for a militia and (ii) forfeitures imposed on persons 
sentenced to death—are insufficient to conclude there was an implied limit 
on the Second Amendment’s scope in the Founding Era that necessitates 
validation of permanent felon firearms bans that are incongruous with 
contemporary constitutional norms applied elsewhere. We can now 
address the third historical justification: Kates’ fragmentary recitation of 
some Founding-Era proposals. 
Kates, whose seminal work has been relied upon by initial authority 
treating felon bans following Heller, further urges that the Second 
Amendment does not benefit persons with prior felony convictions, by 
referencing certain Founding-Era state proposals. He writes: 
Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law 
right to possess arms. That law punished felons with automatic 
forfeiture of all goods, usually accompanied by death. . . . Nor does 
it seem that the Founders considered felons within the common 
law right to arms or intended to confer any such right upon them. 
All the ratifying convention proposals which most explicitly 
detailed the recommended right-to-arms amendment excluded 
criminals and the violent.188 
One can quickly identify numerous concerns with reliance on the 
authority Kates identifies as a basis to support his conclusions:189 it 
identifies only a few provisions; even this limited number did not all 
garner majority support; and the collection omits other Founding-Era 
proposals supporting the opposite conclusion.  
Kates ultimately references the following proposals, a majority of 
which do not involve exclusions for non-dangerous persons, and only one of 
which he identifies as having garnered majority support from a state 
convention—one that excluded persons for engaging in “actual rebellion”: 
(i) a proposal from New Hampshire recommending a federal bill of 
rights allowing disarmament of “any citizen . . . as are or have been in 
actual rebellion;”190 
 
following additional restriction was incorporated in each search (to exclude from the search 
other works): and Year of Publication: 1816. 
188   Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 266 (1983). 
189   See generally Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Historical Justification for Prohibiting 
Dangerous Persons from Possessing Arms, 20 Wyo. L. Rev. 249, 275 (2020) (“Kates’s 
article, however, provides no meaningful support for the theory.”). 
190   Kates, supra note 188, at 222 (quoting 1 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS 326 (2d ed. 1836)). 
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(ii) a proposal from a “rump” of the Pennsylvania delegates 
approving the federal constitution—a proposal that would have 
prohibited “disarming the people or any of them unless for crimes 
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals;”191 and 
(iii) a proposal from Sam Adams limiting protected firearms rights 
to “peaceable citizens.”192 
A Founding-Era proposal allowing disarmament of persons who have been 
“in actual rebellion” is completely different from wholesale disarmament, 
post-sentence, of all persons who have committed serious crimes, whether 
involving physical force or not. 
Moreover, Kates’ listing is not complete, at least insofar as his 
reference to proposals that “most explicitly detailed the recommended 
right-to-arms amendment excluded criminals and the violent”193 is not 
understood as a linguistic sham. Nicholas Johnson and co-authors note: 
(i) Virginia proposed amendments that included, inter alia, “That 
the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated 
militia composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the 
proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state.”194 
(ii) New York’s ratification message included, inter alia, a 
statement “That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a 
well regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of 
bearing arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free 
state.”195 
(iii) North Carolina’s resolution of proposed amendments provided 
a declaration of rights including in pertinent part, “That the people 
have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia, 
composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, 
natural, and safe defence of a free state . . . .”196 
(iv) Rhode Island’s ratification message included in pertinent part, 
“That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well 
regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of bearing 
arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state . . . .”197 
 
191   Id. at 222 (emphasis removed) (quoting 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 665 (1971)). This proposal was rejected. NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET 
AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 310 (2d 
ed. 2018). 
192   Id. at 222 at 222 (quoting SCHWARTZ, supra note 191, at 675). This proposal was 
rejected. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 312. 
193   See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
194   JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 322. 
195   Id. at 325. 
196   Id. at 327. 
197   Id. at 328. 
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None of these has an express exclusion for dangerous persons or persons 
with prior felony convictions. 
Insofar as Kates’ exclusion of these proposals was conscious, and then 
styled as limiting his sample to “explicitly detailed” proposals, that would 
be a sham, disguising the fact that the sampling process ab initio excludes 
proposals that do not support his conclusion. Those that do not support his 
conclusion are naturally written with phrasing he appears to classify as 
not “explicitly detailed.” So indeed, 100% of enactments and proposals 
having language used in a carve-out—a carve-out treating criminals, post-
sentence worse—have carve-outs. But that does not mean those without 
carve-outs ought to be disregarded, because they do not have carve-outs 
and, therefore, are not “explicitly detailed.” 
E. Actual Founding-Era Limits 
The intellectual foundation for concluding those with any prior felony 
convictions are outside the scope of those who benefit from the Second 
Amendment, as we have shown, relies on assuming a broad class of 
persons was, in the Founding Era, deprived of firearms rights, without any 
direct authority whatsoever.198 
Let us then review the actual Founding-Era prohibitions. This author 
is not aware of analogous Founding-Era federal prohibitions.199 One might 
be inclined to stop there. For example, there were religious restrictions on 
holding office in South Carolina under its 1778 constitution,200 and the 
state established “The Christian Protestant religion” as “the established 
religion of this State.”201 So, some caution is necessary before concluding 
an enumerated right protected by the Bill of Rights was subject to an 
 
198   It may be that courts have concluded post-sentence restrictions on violent felons 
must be available, and have simply settled on the most plausible rationale that has come to 
their attention—albeit one that is over-inclusive. The following perhaps highlights the 
relevant concern: 
For example, if the operative clause recognizes an individual right to possess and 
carry in case of confrontation all firearms in common civilian use, then there would 
seemingly be no textual basis to deprive some individuals of that right on the basis 
of a prior conviction or mental illness or to prevent individuals from exercising the 
right to carry firearms if concealed or in “sensitive places.” While there may be good 
policy reasons for such regulations, Heller states that “[c]onstitutional rights are 
enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted 
them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope 
too broad.” In this fashion, Heller’s originalism breaks down. 
Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1194 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
634–35 (2008)). 
199   Marshall describes 1689 religion-based exclusions from firearms rights in England 
as, “the closest thing in the historical record, before World War I, to direct support for 
disarming felons.” Marshall, supra note 22, at 721. 
200   See S.C. CONST. OF 1778, arts. III, XII, XIII, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/sc02.asp#1. 
201   Id. art. XXXVII. 
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implicit exception merely because one can point to an idiosyncratic state 
restriction in the Founding Era.202 
However, were one inclined to turn to state restrictions, it would 
appear there were not state restrictions comparable to the current federal 
felon prohibition. The closest state prohibitions that come to this author’s 
attention, which are not comparable, include: 
• Some provisions disarming “persons who refused to swear an oath 
of allegiance to the state or to the nation;”203 and 
• More generally, restrictions and “law-abiding slaves, free blacks, 
and Loyalists”204 —and other inapposite restrictions adopted in the 
shadow of the Revolutionary War;205 and  
• Assorted circumstances under which dangerous persons might be 
required to post bonds.206  
The third-listed mechanism is patently the most relevant. But let us 
first examine, in brief, the others. Lack of loyalty to one’s government, and 
adhering to governments in opposition, in temporal proximity to the 
American Revolution, is qualitatively different from permanently 
disarming all persons who had previously committed any serious crimes. 
This historical analogue involves different classes of disarmed persons, it 
is much more narrow in scope, and it involves addressing misconduct 
involving harm to the core governance structure. 
Rosenthal asserts, “Although, as Heller noted, framing-era regulation 
was limited, it was not insignificant. Classes of individuals such as slaves, 
 
202   See generally Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247–48 (1833) (“If these 
propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power 
of the general government, not as applicable to the states. In their several constitutions, 
they have imposed such restrictions on their respective governments, as their own wisdom 
suggested; such as they deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they 
judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no further than they are supposed to 
have a common interest.”). 
203  Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. ATF, 700 F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012). 
204   Id. at 200. See also JOHNSON ET AL., supra note  191, at 280 (“American Tories who 
fought for the crown could be disarmed without compensation pursuant to the laws of war. . 
. . After the war was over, . . . [a]s for the former Loyalists or neutrals who stayed in the 
United States, there were no legal restrictions on their acquisition of arms.” A note asks 
the extent to which this informs the understanding of the Second Amendment. Id. See also 
Marshall, supra note 22, at 723–24 (discussing treatment by the Continental Congress of 
persons “notoriously disaffected to the cause of America,” and similar treatment in assorted 
colonies). See generally Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 65, at 244 (“[T]here is simply no 
tradition—from 1791 or 1866—of prohibiting gun possession . . .  for people convicted of 
misdemeanors or subject to civil protective orders. The colonies and then the states 
certainly knew how to ban firearms possession for people who were considered dangerous 
(namely, slaves and Indians”).). 
205   See Greenlee, supra note 189, at 264–65 (discussing colonial restrictions adopted 
during the Revolutionary War applicable to “notoriously disaffected to the cause of 
America” and other restrictions of a similar scope). 
206   See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 379–81 (discussing bonds). 
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freed blacks, and people of mixed race were frequently prohibited from 
owning or carrying guns, and some states extended this bar to Catholics or 
whites unwilling to swear allegiance to the Revolution.”207 One should 
think it self-evidently unsatisfactory to rely on manifestations of 
Founding-Era racial or religious discrimination and intolerance as a basis 
for justifying a contemporary treatment of other classes of persons.208 
Rosenthal notes, “The prophylactic regulations of the framing era 
utilized proxies for dangerousness that we would today find wildly 
inaccurate, if not profoundly offensive, such as religion, race, and political 
loyalty.”209 Rosenthal, however, elides the most salient Founding-Era 
“prophylactic regulations”210—use of bonds of limited duration. 
Donald Braman writes: 
In colonial America, many formal and informal sanctions 
focused attention on the claims that others in the community had 
on the offender. The most typical forms of punishment were fines, 
the posting of bond, and sureties, with shaming, corporal 
punishment, banishment, and the death penalty also employed, 
though less frequently.211 
Some basic principles governing bonds are set forth in a Founding-Era 
treatise, sometimes referenced as Burn’s Justice or Burns’s Justice,212 that 
 
207   Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1210. 
208   State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. 250 (1844), provides an illustration of the use of a 
historical restriction at the time of a constitutional provision’s adoption as giving rise to an 
implicit limit. The case involves a challenge to a statute that required free blacks to obtain 
a license or keep at their houses or to carry. Id. at 250 (headnote). As to its compatibility 
with a state constitutional provision that protected firearms rights “for the defence of the 
state,” id. at 253–54, the court in sum concludes the constitutional right was subject to an 
implicit limit derived from longstanding racial discrimination: 
And, while we acknowledge the solemn obligations to obey the constitution, as well 
in spirit as in letter, we at the same time hold, that nothing should be interpolated 
into that instrument, which the people did not will. We are not at liberty to give an 
artificial and constrained interpretation to the language used, beyond its ordinary, 
popular and obvious meaning. Before, and at the time our constitution was framed, 
there was among us this class of people, and they were subjected to various 
disabilities, from which the white population was exempt. It is impossible to 
suppose, that the framers of the Bill of Rights did not have an eye to the existing 
state of things, and did not act with a full knowledge of the mixed population, for 
whom they were legislating.  
Id. at 254. So, a contemporary justification for restricting firearms rights eerily mimicks 
the odious path previously used to justify racial restrictions on firearms possession. 
209   Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1215. 
210   See id. at 1190 n.23 (containing a sole use of a word having “bond” as its stem in the 
name of a cited article). 
211   Braman, supra note 160, at 1168–69 (footnotes omitted). 
212   Bradstreet v. Furgeson, 17 Wend. 181, 187 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (“Most of the law 
upon the subject of ‘surety for the peace,’ and for ‘good behavior,’ will be found in Burns’s 
Justice, a book of the highest authority in these matters . . . .”). 
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was published in multiple editions under various authors.213 The 
requirements in the Founding Era for a “surety for the peace” or a “surety 
for the good behaviour,” two different types of sureties, are relevant. These 
provided nested restrictions—a surety for good behaviour subsumed the 
conduct covered by a surety for the peace.214 
The mechanics governing these two types of bonds were similar,215 but 
not identical. The individual obligated to obtain the bond would need to 
arrange for one or more persons to provide sureties—persons who would 
forfeit money if the covered person committed some act during the bond’s 
term. Often in the discretion of the justice,216 the surety could have been 
for a term,217 or it could have been for the covered person’s life.218 The 
justice also had discretion in setting number of sureties, and the amount of 
the bond.219 If the ordered surety could not be obtained, the individual was 
subject to imprisonment.220 
This process may have restricted firearms rights in two ways. First, 
there could have been an indirect impact. A review of the 1801 successor 
edition of Burn’s Justice has not revealed the actual considerations of 
persons acting as sureties. However, one should think that one acting as 
surety might only be a surety for a physically dangerous person were the 
covered person’s access to arms restricted.221 This would be consistent with 
an article referenced above,222 in which Braman writes: 
A common combination of both formal and informal sanction was 
the assessing of bonds of surety for good behavior against the 
properties of the defendant and two members of the community 
willing to speak on the defendant’s behalf. These bonds of surety, 
which friends pledged to pay if the offender did not maintain his 
 
213   E.g., Mathew Carey, Preface to THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY 
AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (Philadelphia, Charless, Printer 1801) 
[hereinafter CONDUCTOR GENERALIS] (“The prefent work was compiled from Burn’s Juftice, 
previous to the late revolution; and was favoured with a very high degree of public 
approbation . . . .”). 
214   CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 335 (“[T]he good behaviour include[ed] 
the peace . . . .”). 
215   CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 335. 
216   CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 332 (“[I]t may be regulated by the 
difcretion of fuch juftice, both as to the number and fufficiency of the fureties, and the 
largenefs of the fum, and the continuance of the time for which the party fhall be bound.”). 
See also infra note 229 (referencing judicial discretion to set a term of a peace bond 
following a conviction for dueling). 
217   See supra note 216. 
218   CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 332. 
219   CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 332.  
220   CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 331. 
221   Marshall, supra note 22, at 718–19. 
222   See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
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good behavior, helped draw the community into the policing of the 
offender.223 
Braman quotes a text as stating, “The two sureties required from 
neighbors, friends, or superiors to pressure the defendant to keep his 
pledge show that in deterrence, as in arrest and trial, the criminal justice 
system of the county depended upon the active assistance of the 
community.”224 
Second, there was a direct restriction that appears less prominently 
identified. Although a bond for the peace would not be forfeited absent 
battery or affray, a bond on good behavior expressly limited some forms of 
weapons possession: “[T]he good behavior may be forfeited by the number 
of people a man has, and by their harnefs, or weapons, and the like, altho’ 
they break not the peace.”225 So, to be clear, there were Founding-Era 
provisions directly regulating firearms possession of persons considered 
physically dangerous, but they were not triggered automatically to impose 
a permanent ban on all persons who had ever committed any serious 
crime.  
Illustrations of Use of Bonds for Founding-Era Analogues. We have 
above noted that bonds were used in the Founding Era to restrict 
dangerous behavior of criminals, post-incarceration for some crimes. Let 
us now turn to providing illustrations of some of the crimes for which they 
were used.  
Some of circumstances that would have justified requiring bonds for 
good behavior226 would not seem to be a suitable basis to impose any 
restriction modernly. But bonds were used to address, for example, 
domestic violence and sexual assault.227 A Massachusetts act imposed, 
 
223   Braman, supra note 160, at 1169 n.93. 
224   Braman, supra note 160, at 1169 n.93 (quoting AM. HISTORICAL ASS’N, AMERICAN 
LEGAL RECORDS: CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, at ix, lxxi (Peter Charles 
Hoffer & William B. Scott eds., 1984)).  
225   CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 337. That text later states that a bond 
for good behavior is forfeited “for going armed with great numbers to the terror of the 
people, or fpeaking words tending to fedition,” identifying these acts as ones not triggering 
forfeiture of a surety of the peace. Id. at 346. 
226   See CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 342–43 (“[P]erfons of ill behaviour, 
or evil of fame or report generally, or that fhall keep company with any fuch, or with any 
other fufpicious perfon in the night[;] ... Sufpected perfons who live idly, and yet fare well, 
or are well apparelled, having nothing whereon to live; unlefs upon examination they fhall 
give a good account of fuch their living[;] . . . [the author of] a writing full of obfcene 
ribaldry, without any kind of reflection upon anyone, . . . as a fcandalous perfon of evil 
fame.”). 
227   William Nelson states, for example, “[C]ourts required men who beat their wives to 
enter into peace bonds . . . .” William E. Nelson, Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial 
Virginia, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 757, 795 (2014). A 1761 Massachusetts act states that 
theretofore, conviction of “assaulting or offering any violence or insolence to any woman or 
woman kind in the fields, streets or lanes in any town, or of despoiling them[, etc.],” was to 
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inter alia, a bond requirement on one convicted of dueling—the required 
bond term being changed in the first part of the eighteenth century to one 
year228 from “for so long a time as the . . . court shall judge reasonable.”229 
Posting a bond was, in fact, the ultimate consequence in Sir John Knight’s 
Case,230 the seminal case addressing the seventeenth-century treatment of 
one who “with evil intent”231 traveled with arms to terrify the people. 
Joseph Greenlee provides additional illustrations, including a three-year 
prohibition on bearing arms for treason in connection with Shays’s 
Rebellion.232 
F. Modern Overcriminalization Having No Founding-Era Analogue 
Blocher and Miller note, “Unless courts construe Founding-era 
regulations at a higher level of abstraction, shorten the length of time for 
regulations to be considered long-standing, or both, few modern 
regulations will find indisputable support in Founding-era law.”233 The 
contemporary federal firearms ban extends to some convictions for, for 
example, (i) driving while intoxicated234 and (ii) false alteration of 
government documentation allowing tinted vehicle windows, to extend it 
to a different vehicle.235 The brief authority Kates cites236 simply does not 
support the proposition, and does not provide a basis to conclude, it was 
intended in the Founding Era that firearms rights would be forfeited for 
activity equivalent to these illustrations. 
It is not this article’s purpose to assemble a comprehensive 
compilation of the relevant Founding Era illustrations. Let us, instead, 
turn to an example.  
 
be publicly whipped or incarcerated for 30 days and to “find sureties for the good behavior 
before he be discharged.” Act of 1761, ch. 288, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL 
LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 644, 644 (Boston, T.B. Wait & 
Co. 1814). 
228   Act of 1729/1730, ch. 172, § 1, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF 
THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 470–71 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814). 
229   Act for the Punishing and Preventing of Dueling (1716), ch. 131, § 2, reprinted in 
THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 
422, 423 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814).  
230   Sir John Knight’s Case, (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 n.a (K.B.), additional 
proceedings at (1686) 90 Eng. Rep. 330 (K.B.). 
231   The opinion references actions “malo animo,” Sir John Knight’s Case, 90 Eng. Rep. 
at 330 (emphasis added), defined in JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 96, as “[w]ith evil 
intent; with malice.”  
232   Greenlee, supra note 189, at 268–69. 
233   Blocher & Miller, supra note 34, at 328 (footnote omitted). See generally Marshall, 
supra note 22, at 697 (stating, “The need is particularly acute given the cancerous growth 
since the 1920s of ‘regulatory’ crimes punishable by more than a year in prison, as distinct 
from traditional common-law crimes.”). 
234   See supra notes 82, 94 and accompanying text. 
235   See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
236   See supra note 190–192 and accompanying text. 
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There is a federal prohibition on various types of insider trading in 
securities,237 for which willful violators are criminally punishable with up 
to twenty years imprisonment.238 A 2012 act expressly provides that 
members of Congress and employees of Congress are not excluded from the 
prohibition.239 A conviction will give rise to a permanent firearms 
prohibition under some state law,240 and the theory generally excluding 
the non-virtuous from the Second Amendment would not invalidate this 
prohibition. It also may give rise to a permanent federal felon 
prohibition—there is limited authority as to whether it would be within 
the exception in the federal ban for commission of certain business 
practice crimes.241 
 
237   15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91). 
238   15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 
239   Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK ACT), Pub. L. No. 
112–105, § 4, 126 Stat. 291, 292 (2012) (“(a) AFFIRMATION OF NONEXEMPTION.—
Members of Congress and employees of Congress are not exempt from the insider trading 
prohibitions arising under the securities laws, including section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b–5 thereunder.”). 
240   See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
241   One case holds securities fraud, arising from with false filings with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, is within the exception. Reyes v. Sessions, 342 F. Supp. 3d 141, 
144, 156 (D.D.C. 2018). See supra note 52. It concluded the common theme identifying 
crimes within the exclusion is they are “commercial crimes intended to address economic 
harm to competitors or consumers.” Id. at 150. However, it would appear that the purposes 
of this act are, rather, to assure “clean” government. The report on the act states: 
The Committee nonetheless concluded that it is of the utmost importance for the 
American people to have full confidence that all Members of Congress act to serve 
the American people rather than their own financial interests. It therefore reported 
S. 2038 to establish a clear policy that insider trading will not be tolerated within 
the halls of Congress, and to ensure that any instances of insider trading by 
Members or their staff will be subject to the same civil and criminal laws that apply 
to everyone else. 
S. Rep. 112–244, at 2–3 (2012). 
Dicta in another case would indicate not. United States v. Geyler, 932 F.2d 1330, 1336 
n.9 (9th Cir. 1991) (suggesting federal convictions for “mail fraud or securities fraud” are 
outside the exception), abrogated on other grounds by Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 
368 (1994). 
In any case, there has been no suggestion that an exception from felon prohibition for 
securities fraud or insider trading is constitutionally required. The Ninth Circuit, for 
example, vaguely implies that only much less serious crimes than insider trading or 
securities fraud are in jeopardy of being too insignificant for the Second Amendment to 
allow them to be predicate offenses for a permanent firearms ban. United States v. Phillips, 
827 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016), notes: 
Our holding does not address, however, the question of whether there are limits 
on Congress’s and the States’ ability to define any old crime as a felony and thereby 
use it as the basis for a § 922(g)(1) conviction, consistent with the Second 
Amendment. . . . Can Congress or the States define petty larceny as a felony? Of 
course. Can a conviction for stealing a lollipop then serve as a basis under 
§ 922(g)(1) to ban a person for the rest of his life from ever possessing a firearm, 
consistent with the Second Amendment? That remains to be seen. 
Id. at 1176 n.5. 
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One supposes the founders would not have thought this type of 
activity equivalent of a capital crime—sufficiently egregious to deprive one 
of firearms rights. Why so? Because it was apparently practiced by 
intimates of the founders themselves.  
Bowers discusses insider trading on Revolutionary War debt—debt 
that became much more valuable on its assumption by the federal 
government.242 Bowers notes Alexander Hamilton’s role in this 
speculation: “In all this, Hamilton had no part and no responsibility 
beyond having made indiscrete disclosures of which his friends availed 
themselves, through buying and selling through his agents in New York 
and Philadelphia for his brother-in-law.” To express the principle in 
language parallel to that used in Medina v. Whitaker:243 With this 
perspective, it is difficult to conclude that the public, in 1791, would have 
understood someone who participated in acts of the type committed by 
intimates of founders, with Alexander Hamilton’s indiscrete assistance, to 
be outside the scope of those entitled to possess arms. 
G. Conclusion 
Our brief review of the Founding-Era restrictions on criminals’ 
firearms possession, post sentence, has revealed restrictions that are not 
analogous the contemporary firearms bans imposed on persons with prior 
felony convictions. The Founding-Era restrictions were tailored—their 
term varies depending on the nature of the crimes. That is in contrast to 
the current federal restrictions (and some state restrictions) that, absent 
reinstatement, are generally permanent244 and, other than for the 
wholesale exclusion of some business practices crimes, are independent of 
whether the prior activity is associated with any threat of future violence.  
The scholarly fount of the jurisprudential position that the Second 
Amendment does not benefit those who have previously committed 
“serious” crimes and are therefore not “virtuous” relies on a censored 
sampling of Founding-Era documents. It equates all serious crimes with 
crimes for which the defendant was subject to capital punishment, 
although that was not the case in the Founding Era. The historical context 
in which the Second Amendment was adopted is manifestly insufficient to 
conclude that a restriction not actually present at the time—that all who 
had previously committed serious crimes were excluded from firearms 
rights—was implicitly read into its language.  
 
242   See CLAUDE G. BOWERS, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA 43–46 (referencing full repayment of debt purchased at discounts of 80% or 
more). 
243   913 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“With this perspective, it is difficult to conclude 
that the public, in 1791, would have understood someone facing death and estate forfeiture 
to be within the scope of those entitled to possess arms.”). 
244   See supra notes 32–33, 62 and accompanying text. 
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Contemporary courts, then, are not required by the Founding-Era 
precedent to exclude the “non-virtuous” from all firearms rights. The 
propriety of contemporary judicial reliance on a person not being 
“virtuous” as a basis to deprive him or her of firearms rights, then, 
depends on that being a valid approach generally, under contemporary 
constitutional norms.  
The following Part turns to the contemporary judicial reliance on a 
person not being virtuous as curtailing some of his or her constitutional 
rights. As we shall see, Supreme Court precedent rejects that approach. 
Additionally, the almost insignificant number of contemporary cases that 
follow that approach use it to support odious outcomes. 
VI. CONTEMPORARY CASES REFERENCING THE VIRTUOUS OUTSIDE THE 
CONTEXT OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
A. Case Statistics 
To assess the extent to which modern courts have considered a person 
being not being “virtuous” in ascertaining the scope of his or her 
constitutional rights, the following Westlaw search of opinions was 
performed: adv: virtuous & (“rational basis” or “intermediate scrutiny” or 
“strict scrutiny”). This revealed a total of 141 opinions. Our data set of 
opinions was reduced 245to 138 by omitting three issued before 1969.246  
The number of opinions per year is depicted in the following figure, 
with the light gray bars showing opinions including the phrase “Second 
Amendment” tallied per year (identified as “2A”): 
 
245   This search does not omit cases referencing “non-virtuous” instead of “virtuous.” 
See Westlaw search: advanced: (“rational basis” “intermediate scrutiny” “strict scrutiny”) & 
non-virtuous % virtuous) (May 22, 2020) (identifying two secondary sources but no cases). 
246   The omitted cases are from 1949, 1920 and 1871. 
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Figure 1 
 
Of course, one could use other filters to identify cases that reference 
one being virtuous. One could search for cases including “virtue,” which 
would involve many irrelevant cases including terms such as “by virtue 
of.” Or, one could use different filters to identify those addressing 
constitutional issues. Indeed, this investigation involves sampling of 
opinions. As long as the filter is not biased—and there is no reason to 
suppose that it is—the analysis of the sampled results is designed to 
illuminate the general issue.  
The annual number of opinions not referencing “Second Amendment” 
throughout the fifty-year period varies from zero to four. The first opinion 
referencing the Second Amendment occurs in 2006. Starting in about 
2010, the typical number of opinions per year increases, with opinions 
referencing “Second Amendment” generally outnumbering the others. 
An additional initial indication that reference to “virtuous” is used 
differently in cases involving the Second Amendment is illuminated by 
referencing a discrepancy in frequency with certain Westlaw KeyCite flags 
are associated with the opinions. The most adverse indicator, red, is 
associated with 11% of the opinions containing “Second Amendment,” and 
25% of the other opinions.247 That is, this signal is more than twice as 
 
247   Westlaw describes a red KeyCite flag as indicating the opinion “is no longer good 
law for at least one of the points of law it contains.” Thomson Reuters Westlaw, KeyCite on 
Thomson Reuters Westlaw (2016), https://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/KeyCite
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common among opinions not containing “Second Amendment” than it is in 
opinions containing that phrase.  
Figure 2 
 All Years Before 2006 2006 and after 
 No 2A 2A No 2A No 2A 2A 
Cert. Pet. 0 0% 1 2%   
 0 0% 1 2% 
None 35 42% 29 54% 20 36% 15 54% 29 54% 
Red 21 25% 6 11% 14 25% 7 25% 6 11% 
Yellow 28 33% 18 33% 22 39% 6 21% 18 33% 
             
Total 84  54  56  28  54  
So, at this point, we have: Cases that reference the virtuous 
disproportionately involve the Second Amendment, and cases that 
reference the virtuous but don’t involve the Second Amendment are more 
frequently dubious.  
B. Relevant Supreme Court Authority 
The raw statistics presented in Part VI.A suggest a qualitative 
difference in the extent to which courts rely on whether a person is 
“virtuous” in ascertaining the scope of constitutional rights, depending on 
whether the Second Amendment is at issue. However, a review of the 
analyses of the cases not implicating the Second Amendment, i.e., review 
of the opinion language, reveals the variation is more profound. The raw 
statistics above, before considering how reference to being “virtuous” is 
used in an opinion, overstate reliance on this principle in cases not 
involving the Second Amendment. The bulk of them reference the virtuous 
or non-virtuous in some inapposite context. So, actual reliance on this 
principle, as a basis to curtail an express right, is almost entirely absent 
from the sample outside the context of the Second Amendment. 
As noted above,248 the contemporary justification for validating 
firearms prohibitions arising from any felony convictions, and exempting 
them from even as-applied challenge, relies on the notion that absence of 
virtue, a consequence of a conviction for a “serious” crime, can work a 
forfeiture of a civil right. The relevant Supreme Court authority in the 
sample, outside the context of the Second Amendment, however, expressly 
rejects that view. So it is not simply that reliance on a person not being 
virtuous is more frequently made in cases involving the Second 
Amendment. Rather, outside the Second Amendment context, the 
Supreme Court expressly rejects the view that these lower courts have 
resuscitated in the Second Amendment context. 
 
248   See supra notes 67, 79–81, 94, 98 and accompanying text. 
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The Supreme Court case referencing the issue—the constitutional 
consequences of not being “virtuous”—that is most prominently relied-
upon by other courts since the middle of the last century is Hill v. Texas.249 
Hill v. Texas explicitly rejects curtailment of constitutional rights by 
virtue of the fact that a person is not “virtuous.”  
The case involves a motion to quash an indictment for rape, on the 
basis that the selection of grand jurors was infected by racial 
discrimination.250 The Court holds that the State failed to rebut the 
claimant’s prima facie case of racial discrimination in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, relying on raw statistics.251 The Court concludes 
the defendant might thereafter be indicted and tried, but only under 
procedures conforming to constitutional requirements.252 
The litigation revealed substantial evidence of the defendant’s having 
actually committed the crime.253 Yet the Court ends its opinion with the 
following language bearing on the relationship between being virtuous and 
benefitting from constitutional protection: 
Nor is this Court at liberty to grant or withhold the benefits of 
equal protection, which the Constitution commands for all, merely 
as we may deem the defendant innocent or guilty. . . . Equal 
protection of the laws is something more than an abstract right. It 
is a command which the state must respect, the benefits of which 
every person may demand. Not the least merit of our 
constitutional system is that its safeguards extend to all—the 
least deserving as well as the most virtuous.254 
 
249   316 U.S. 400 (1942). 
250   Id. at 400–01. 
251   Id. at 404 (referencing the “continuous omission of [blacks] from the grand jury lists 
for so long a period as sixteen years or more”). 
252   Id. at 406. 
253   The petitioner was convicted of rape. Hill v. State, 157 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1941), rev’d sub nom. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942). His identity was evidenced 
by: (i) a paper documenting his prison discharge being inside a pocket torn from the 
offender’s coat during the criminal altercation; (ii) his confession to assault, but a denial of 
rape; and (iii) the identification by both the victim and a companion present at, and also 
victimized at, the scene. Hill v. State, 157 S.W.2d at 370–71. In addition, four passers-by 
saw the final moments of the violent encounter. Id. at 370–71.  
The constitutional violation found by the Court, involving the manner in which the 
petitioner had been indicted, does not indict the decision-making process of the petit jury’s 
finding the petitioner had committed the offense. 
254   316 U.S. at 406. 
Of course, there is an ebb and flow over time in the norms as to what attributes give 
rise to being “virtuous.” A concurring opinion in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392 
n.4 (1997), cautions against relaxing constitutional restrictions on governmental action on 
the basis of changed social norms: 
It is always somewhat dangerous to ground exceptions to constitutional 
protections in the social norms of a given historical moment. The purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness “is to preserve that degree of 
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The Court’s reference to a party not being virtuous is not dicta. 
Rather, it is part of the analysis yielding the holding. 
Additionally, the court uses the term “virtuous” with a meaning 
analogous (or somewhat) analogous to the usage in the Founding Era. It 
appears related to performance of duties as a citizen—compliance with 
law—as opposed to an alternative, more modern, usage referencing lack of 
promiscuity. 
Lastly, the court follows this approach in a circumstance that 
restrains punishment for egregious acts.  
The principle was more recently referenced by the Supreme Court in a 
concurring opinion in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,255 a case 
that follows a similar approach as to the consequences of being virtuous. 
In the case, the Court expressly disclaims the notion that a person’s being 
virtuous increases his (in that case, its) free speech rights.  
The case involves a state statute restricting the scope of corporate 
speech rights. In particular, the statute prevented banks and certain 
business corporations from making political contributions.256 The 
concurring opinion states the following as to the import of any allegation 
that media conglomerates would be more virtuous than other business 
enterprises: 
In terms of Massachusetts’ other concern, the interests of 
minority shareholders, I perceive no basis for saying that the 
managers and directors of the media conglomerates are more or 
less sensitive to the views and desires of minority shareholders 
than are corporate officers generally. Nor can it be said, even if 
relevant to First Amendment analysis—which it is not—that the 
former are more virtuous, wise, or restrained in the exercise of 
corporate power than are the latter.257 
C. Apt References to Virtuous Persons in Contemporary Lower-Court 
Jurisprudence Citing a Scrutiny Standard 
Introduction. Review of the lower-court authority identified in our 
search of opinions reveals the following pattern: 
• Some lower-court authority relies on the principle expressed in 
Hill v. Texas in discussions finding Equal Protection violations—in 
 
respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of their property that existed 
when the provision was adopted—even if a later, less virtuous age should become 
accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion ‘reasonable.’” 
Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
255   435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
256   435 U.S. at 793 (majority opinion). 
257   435 U.S.  at 797 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
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favor of unwed mothers (as to educational opportunities),258 aliens 
(as to educational opportunities),259 and motor vehicle guests (as to 
claim limitation under guest statutes);260 and 
• Other lower-court authority limits introduction of evidence of a 
crime victim’s attributes, as implicitly casting a criminal 
defendant in a poor light, ultimately founded on principles of the 
Eighth Amendment and that “[t]he law exists to protect all persons 
equally.”261 
Of course, all this authority highlights that Second Amendment rights are 
treated adversely, in comparison with the treatment of other enumerated 
rights.  
A reference to being non-virtuous as a basis for curtaining rights 
bleeds into a few contemporary cases through citation to non-
contemporary cases that rely on that mode of analysis, in language or in a 
context that is contrary to contemporary norms.262 Excluding those cases, 
the entire scope of contemporary authority, not referencing the term 
“Second Amendment,” relying on a person not being virtuous as a basis for 
curtailing rights, is apparently limited to the following three illustrations: 
• authority upholding criminalization of sexual contact between 
persons of the same gender;263 
 
258   See infra notes 270–Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text. 
259   See infra notes 274–278 and accompanying text. 
260   See infra notes 279–284 and accompanying text. 
261   State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172, 1203 (N.J. 1988). A number of contemporary 
cases from New Jersey examine whether the fact that a crime victim was virtuous can be 
introduced. Oliver v. Hendricks, No. CIV.A. 04–4219 (JAG), 2006 WL 1540823, at *1, *5–6 
(D.N.J. May 31, 2006); State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 179 (N.J. 1996); State v. Erazo, 
594 A.2d 232, 258 (N.J. 1991) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State 
v. Cooper, Nos. A–2011–12T1, A–2988–12T1, A–3099–12T, 2014 WL 11072007, at *16 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 4, 2015). Williams is not included in the sample because it does 
not include “rational basis,” “strict scrutiny” or “intermediate scrutiny.” 
262   Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 241 n.8 
(1985) (quoting prior authority stating, the “pueblo Indians . . . are a peaceable, 
industrious, intelligent, honest, and virtuous people.” (quoting United States v. Joseph, 94 
U.S. 614, 616 (1876)); Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing 
the abolished cause of action for seduction as, “The old action for seduction required that 
the woman was ‘. . . chaste and virtuous at the time of the alleged seduction ...’, and it was 
used primarily to protect young, inexperienced women who had succumbed to the sexual 
advances of older men.” (quoting Briggs v. Stroud, 126 P.2d 409, 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942)); 
Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 335 n.17 (D.C. 1990) (Schwelb, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting an earlier opinion as follows: “[W]ill you not more 
readily infer assent in the practiced Messalina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and 
virtuous Lucretia?” (quoting People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838)); 
State v. Rundlett, 391 A.2d 815, 820 & n.17 (Me. 1978), (including in a collection of cases 
that it describes as having “prior chastity was an element of the offense” of statutory rape, 
one statute requiring the victim be “[o]f previous chaste and virtuous character.” (quoting 
1895 Okla. Sess. Laws 104)). 
263   See infra notes 285–295 and accompanying text. 
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• criminalization of heterosexual, consensual oral sex;264 and 
• ancillary judicial ruminations by Judge Easterbrook, in a 
concurring opinion, concerning treatment of prisoners.265 
Lastly, a number of cases identified in the text-based opinion search 
that do not reference “Second Amendment” are inapposite to our inquiry. 
Those cases address being “virtuous,” where the reference does not concern 
whether being virtuous influences the extent to which one benefits from a 
constitutional right.  
In particular, a number of cases address defining the scope of those 
beliefs that are religious and, therefore, within the protection of the 
Religion Clauses.266 That authority addresses what is the protected 
conduct, rather than who benefits.  
 
264   See infra notes 296–298 and accompanying text. 
265   See infra notes 299–306 and accompanying text. 
266   In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court addresses what is 
protected by the Religion Clauses. stating, “A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, 
may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based 
on purely secular considerations . . . .” Id. at 215. A large number of the cases collected in 
the text search of opinions quote this language in Yoder. E.g., Moore-King v. Cty. of 
Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 571 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215), abrogated 
by Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Littlefield v. 
Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 290 & n.22 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Yoder), 
affirming Littlefield v. Forney Ind. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681, 699 (N.D. Tex. 2000) 
(quoting Yoder); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 178 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (quoting Yoder), aff’g Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 899 F. 
Supp. 1443, 1451 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (quoting Yoder); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 
F.3d 454, 461 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Yoder); Middleton v. Pan, No. Cv 16–5224–svw (Agr), 
2016 WL 11518596, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2016) (quoting Yoder), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. CV 16–5224–SVW (AGR), 2017 WL 10543984 (C.D. Cal. July 
13, 2017); Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1086 n.3 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting 
Yoder); Conner v. Tilton, No. C 07–4965 MMC (PR)b, 2009 WL 4642392, at *14 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 2, 2009) (quoting  Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 797–98 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Yoder)), aff’d, 430 F. App’x 617 (9th Cir. 2011); Jensen v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1275 
(D. Utah 1999) (quoting Yoder), aff’d, 3 F. App’x 905 (10th Cir. 2001); Shabazz v. 
Barnauskas, 600 F. Supp. 712, 724 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (quoting Yoder), aff’d, 790 F.2d 1536 
(11th Cir. 1986); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 919 (Ariz. 2019) 
(quoting Yoder); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 92 
(Cal. 2004); Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023, 1027 (Fla. 2004) (quoting 
Yoder); People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Mich. 1993) (quoting Yoder); State v. 
Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 891 (N.D. 1980) (quoting Yoder); Luken v. Brigano, 797 N.E.2d 
1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Yoder); Larson v. Burmaster, 720 N.W.2d 134, 
148 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Yoder); Shannon & Riordan v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 
451 N.W.2d 479, 486 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1989). It was also quoted in a dissent in a case 
reversed on appeal. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 701 
(9th Cir. 1986) (Beezer, J., dissenting in part), rev’d sub nom. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).  
Additionally, many cases paraphrase Yoder in terms referencing being “virtuous.” 
Birkes v. Mills, No. 03:10–cv–00032–HU, 2011 WL 5117859, at *7 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 2011), 
report and recommendation adopted, No. 03:10–CV–32–HU, 2011 WL 5118787 (D. Or. Oct. 
25, 2011), vacated, Dec. 16, 2011, and report and recommendation adopted, No. 03:10–CV–
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A few cases reference the need for a virtuous citizenry in supporting 
the value of education, either through parenting or as provided by 
schools.267 That authority as well does not bear on our issue: Whether 
some class of persons, on account of not being virtuous, does not benefit 
from a constitutional right. Rather, that authority examines the extent to 
which the public at a whole has some right. 
Let us exclude (i) cases that make reference to the virtuous or non-
virtuous only through reference to non-contemporary cases relying on that 
approach (an offensive character being a unifying theme);268 and (ii) the 
ruminations of Judge Easterbrook. That leaves us with only two reported 
cases in the last half-century, referencing at least one of three 
constitutional standards of scrutiny but not referencing the term “Second 
Amendment,” in which a judge relies on persons not being virtuous as a 
basis for curtailing civil rights. Each uses “virtuous,” not as is being used 
in the Second Amendment context (as was used in the Founding Era), but, 
rather, in respect of the extent and nature of sexual activity. And each is 
no longer good law. The remainder of this Part VI.C provides some details 
of the cases that have been classified as provided in this introduction to 
Part VI.B. 
 
32–HU, 2012 WL 930243 (D. Or. Mar. 19, 2012); Monroe v. Commonwealth, 
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 535 A.2d 1222, 1225 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (stating, 
“And, secular beliefs however virtuous and admirable, of course, do not fall within the 
ambit of First Amendment protection.”). 
Cochran v. City of Atlanta, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2017), examines a claim a 
governmental employee was fired for publishing a book titled, Who Told You That You 
Were Naked?: Overcoming the Stronghold of Condemnation, has as a “goal[]” “to guide men 
to live faith-filled, virtuous lives.” Id. at 1282. The court concludes, inter alia, it “not 
unreasonable” to conclude the book’s publication would have made it difficult to recruit 
LGBT personnel, id. at 1290–91, in dismissing the plaintiff’s free speech retaliation claim. 
Id. at 1288, 1291–92. The employee’s position is also discussed in a prior proceeding. 
Cochran v. City of Atlanta, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1308–09 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
267   Perhaps most prominent would be a dissent by Justice Thomas in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786 (2011). In that case, Justice Thomas 
dissents from a holding that the First Amendment invalidates “a state law that prohibits 
the direct sale or rental of certain video games to minors because the law ‘abridg[es] the 
freedom of speech.’” Id. at 821 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). In 
support of his view, he asserts, as to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: 
[I]t was widely accepted that children needed close monitoring and carefully 
planned development. . . . 
The Revolution only amplified these concerns. The Republic would require 
virtuous citizens, which necessitated proper training from childhood. . . . 
Based on these views of childhood, the founding generation understood parents 
to have a right and duty to govern their children’s growth. 
Id. at 827–28.  
Our search identified other cases involving access to education. Lake View Sch. Dist. 
No. 25 of Phillips Cty. v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 491 (Ark. 2002), supplemented, 189 
S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2004); Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711, 718 n.6 (Mich. 1973) (Kavanagh 
& Levin, JJ., concurring); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 393 (Vt. 1997). 
268   See supra note 262. 
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Equal Protection Cases Following Hill v. Texas. Our search uncovered 
three opinions, excluding one reversed on appeal,269 that favorably rely on 
the above-quoted principles from Hill v. Texas. Perry v. Grenada 
Municipal Separate School District270 involves a challenge, under the 
Equal Protection Clause, to a “policy of the school board of denying 
admission to unwed mothers.”271 In the introductory paragraph beginning 
its Equal Protection analysis, the court concludes by quoting the last two 
sentences from Hill v. Texas quoted above.272  
The court concludes the policy is unconstitutional. For our purposes, 
the relevance of the case is two-fold. First, the court, in relying on Hill, 
rejects the notion that not being virtuous results in forfeiture of 
constitutional rights. Second, it is not the core of the Founding Era 
conceptualization of a virtuous citizen273 that gives rise to putative 
potential for classification as non-virtuous but, rather, sexual activity. 
Although the more modern references are not limited to sexual activity, 
they do seem to be concentrated in supporting views that are peculiar from 
the contemporary perspective. 
In re Alien Children Education Litigation274 provides a second 
illustration of a court quoting Hill v. Texas. The opinion notes: 
At issue is a statute which prohibits the use of a state fund to 
educate persons who are not citizens of the United States or 
“legally admitted aliens.” That statute by negative implication 
also permits local school officials to exclude undocumented 
children from the public schools.275  
This court as well concludes an Equal Protection analysis, which holds 
the statute unconstitutional,276 with a paragraph including a quotation 
from a portion of Hill v. Texas quoted above.277 
 
269   A fourth opinion quoting Hill, from an intermediate California appellate court, was 
reversed on appeal. People v. Guzman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339 (Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 107 P.3d 
860 (Cal. 2005). The intermediate appellate court holds unconstitutional, as a violation of 
Equal Protection, id. at 353, a statutory scheme addressing recidivism, providing better 
treatment for those on parole than those on probation. Because the case was reversed on 
appeal, it does not comfortably fit in the same class as other contemporary authority 
implementing the treatment of the non-virtuous referenced in Hill v. Texas. 
270   300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969). 
271   Id. at 749–50. 
272   Id. at 750–51 (quoting Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. at 406) (quoting the last two 
sentences quoted supra text accompanying note 254). 
273   See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text. 
274   501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd unreported mem. (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 1981), 
aff’d sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
275   Id at 549 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
276   Id. at 584. 
277   Id. at 583 (quoting Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. at 406) (quoting the last two sentences 
quoted supra text accompanying note 254). 
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It is somewhat difficult to contextualize the court’s reference to those 
not virtuous. The court notes, “Section 21.031 penalizes children because 
of acts committed by their parents,”278 suggesting that insofar as there is 
some reference to persons not being virtuous, it would be attributed to the 
parents of the adversely affected children. In any case, the pertinent 
perspectives illuminated by this opinion are that reference to one not being 
virtuous is discredited in ascertaining the scope of constitutional rights. 
Our third lower-court case in our data set relying on Hill v. Texas is 
McGeehan v. Bunch.279 McGeehan examines the constitutionality of a 
guest statute, which prevented recovery by non-paying guests against 
their drivers for mere negligence.280 The case addresses “whether or not 
[New Mexico’s] guest statute by creating a distinction between paying and 
nonpaying automobile guests violates the equal protection clause of the 
federal and state constitutions.”281 
One justification for the statute that the court examines is to “promote 
hospitality, by excluding one who gratuitously provides a ride from suit 
based on ordinary negligence,”282 the principle being that “to sue one’s host 
for negligence is the epitome of ingratitude.”283 The court rejects the notion 
that lack of virtue, in the form of ingratitude, forms a suitable 
consideration for elimination of compensation for ordinary negligence. The 
opinion adopts the analysis in a student comment, which states in part: 
“Moreover, it has been suggested that ‘it is none of the state’s business 
what kind of virtuous emotions the citizenry feels or fails to feel.’ Indeed, it 
is questionable whether the protection against ingratitude is a permissible 
state interest.’”284 
In sum, these cases referencing being “virtuous” in ascertaining the 
scope of constitutional rights reject the notion that rights are diminished 
where one is not virtuous. 
Modern Opinions Referencing the Non-Virtuous as Having 
Diminished Rights and the Reason to Reject That Authority. There are 
some contemporary, or almost-cotemporary, opinions that chart a course 
away from the referenced principle expressed in Hill v. Texas. The small 
collection of majority opinions at the core are decades old, and reflect 
 
278   Id. at 572. The court goes on to quote another case to the following effect: “A more 
exacting scrutiny of the Texas law also appears warranted when consideration is given to 
the decisions of the Supreme Court refusing to penalize and stigmatize children who are 
not in a position to prevent the wrongful acts of their parents.” Id. at 573 (quoting Doe v. 
Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 582). 
279   540 P.2d 238 (N.M. 1975). 
280   Id. at 309. 
281   Id. at 239. 
282   Id. at 311. 
283   Id. at 311–12. 
284   Id. at 312 (quoting JoAnn Wierwille, Comment, Review of the Past, Preview of the 
Future: The Viability of Automobile Guest Statutes, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 709, 719–20 (1973).  
  
 59 Barondes-firearms-virtuous-accepted.docx 
governmental intrusion into private sexual conduct, odious by 
contemporary standards and rejected by current jurisprudence. 
Criminalization of Currently Protected Sexual Conduct. Let us turn to 
the two almost-contemporary cases that appear directly to reject the Hill 
v. Texas principle, i.e., cases that are the intellectual companions of cases 
that deny Second Amendment rights to persons deemed non-virtuous. Our 
summary illuminates the odious intellectual company kept by opinions 
depriving the non-virtuous of the civil right to bear arms.  
State v. Walsh,285 a 1986 case, holds that criminalization of “deviate 
sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex”286 violates neither 
the Equal Protection provisions of the Federal Constitution287 nor the 
Missouri Constitution.288 The court notes that, earlier in the year, the 
Supreme Court held in Bowers v. Hardwick,289 “[T]he United States 
Constitution does not confer upon consenting homosexuals a fundamental 
right to engage in sodomy.”290 The Missouri Supreme Court continues, 
distinguishing 1980 Pennsylvania authority291 invalidating a statute 
prohibiting some intimate activity between unmarried persons:292 
We decline to follow the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, because we 
believe, to borrow from Mr. Justice Black, “Whether the 
legislature takes for its textbook [John Stuart Mill, Thomas 
Aquinas or Lord Devlin] or some other is no concern of ours. * * * 
[R]elief, if any be needed, lies not with us but with the [General 
Assembly].” 
We believe further that punishing homosexual acts as a Class 
A misdemeanor . . . is rationally related to the State’s 
constitutionally permissible objective of implementing and 
promoting the public morality.293 
The Missouri opinion alters Justice Black’s language, substituting 
different “textbooks.”294  
 
285   713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986). 
286   Id. at 509 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 566.090.1(3) (1978), repealed by H.B. 1698, 
1236, 995, 1362, 1290, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006)). 
287   Id. at 513. 
288   Id. at 513. 
289   478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
290   Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 511. 
291   Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980). 
292  Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 94 n.1. 
293   713 S.W.2d at 512 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963)) (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I–II, 
question 96, art. 2; and PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965)). 
294   See Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 732 (referencing “Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord 
Keynes, or some other”). 
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The opinion includes reference to the “virtuous” in a footnote quoting 
Thomas Aquinas. Insofar applicable to the circumstances the court had 
under its consideration, it would indicate the following: It appears the 
Missouri Supreme Court deferred to an apparent determination by the 
Missouri General Assembly that the prohibited activity was one “from 
which the virtuous abstain”: “Now human law is framed for a number of 
human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore 
human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but 
only the more grievous vices * * * and chiefly those that are to the hurt of 
others * * *.”295 
In sum, the Missouri Supreme Court’s alteration of Justice Black’s 
language provides one of the two somewhat recent cases in our data set, 
not referencing “Second Amendment,” referencing persons who putatively 
are not virtuous in denying them constitutional protection. It does so in 
validating criminalization of consensual homosexual sexual activity. 
The second such case is the 2000 case State v. Smith.296 In that case, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court rejects the argument that either the Federal 
Constitution or the Louisiana Constitution invalidates the criminalization 
of heterosexual, consensual oral sex. The opinion announcing the 
disposition states, “[T]he defendant would have us announce . . . a 
constitutional right to engage in oral sex. This we are unwilling to do.”297 
The court, by happenstance, quotes the same language from Ferguson v. 
Skrupa that the Missouri Supreme Court quoted fourteen years earlier in 
State v. Walsh, similarly altering the quote from Justice Black with the 
same reference to work from Thomas Aquinas that Walsh substituted.298 
Other Contemporary Authority: Easterbrook’s Paean to the Era of 
Chain Gangs. The other contemporary case most on-point in referencing 
the status as non-virtuous in supporting restrictions on civil rights is a 
concurring opinion by Judge Easterbrook in David K. v. Lane.299 The case 
involves incarcerated prisoners’ claims that failure to enforce state 
regulations restricting gang activities in prison violated their Equal 
Protection rights, as well as federal regulations.300 
Easterbrook uses a concurring opinion in the case to provide ancillary 
observations on treatment in prison. Easterbrook’s opinion is untethered 
to the doctrine of the causes of action asserted—one would not describe the 
opinion as expounding a deductive analysis of the relevant textual source 
of law. None of the following character strings appears in the body of 
 
295   Id. (quoting AQUINAS, supra note 293, pt. I–II, question 96, art. 2). 
296   766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000). 
297   Id. at 506. 
298   See 766 So.2d at 511 (substituting “[John Stuart Mill, Thomas Acquinas or Lord 
Devlin]” for the texts referenced by Justice Black (footnotes omitted)). 
299   839 F.2d 1265, 1278–80 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
300   839 F.2d at 1266–67 (majority opinion). 
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Easterbrook’s opinion: “Equal Protection” or “14th Amendment” or 
“Fourteenth Amendment” or “Title VI” (the title on which a federal 
regulatory claim was founded)301 or “CFR” or “C.F.R.”302 Of these, only 
“Equal Protection” appears in even a footnote (and that only once, to 
identify the ultimate conclusion.)303 Rather, after stating, “[Y]ou can’t be a 
lion tamer without a whip and chair,”304 Easterbrook opts to denigrate the 
complainants as part of supporting rejection of a claim: 
The “governed” in prison are not virtuous republican yeomen. The 
crowd milling around the mess hall at Pontiac has little in 
common with the crowd in the lobby of the Lyric Opera of Chicago 
on opening night; it wasn’t good manners that got people 
invitations to a maximum-security prison. A legal system that 
both requires prison officials to suppress gangs and informs them 
that we shall transfer their wealth to the gangs if they act too 
firmly asks the impossible.305 
These observations are preceded by an apparent paean to the era of 
chain gangs and the like: 
To cope with gangs, prisons must be able to inflict real 
punishments—sanctions going beyond mere presence in a 
maximum-security prison, for inmates suffer confinement and 
indignity whether they belong to gangs or not. 
Thirty years ago a prisoner who wore forbidden insignia or 
sassed a guard could find himself on a chain gang. No more. He 
might have been thrown in the “hole” or put on bread and water 
for a month. No more. That would violate the current 
understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. He 
might have had parole put off until doomsday, but the reduction of 
parole decisionmaking to a largely mechanical process—and the 
impending demise of parole under determinate sentencing 
schemes—make this less of a threat. 
 
301   See 839 F.2d at 1274 (majority opinion). 
302   See 839 F.2d at 1278–80 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (these character strings not 
identified in body text with the following Westlaw search: adv: CI(“839 F.2d 1265”) & 
(“equal protection” or “14th amendment” or “fourteenth amendment” or cfr or “c.f.r.” or 
“title vi”)). 
303   See 839 F.2d at 1279 n.3 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“Unless that change would 
have improved the minority’s treatment, however, there is no “discrimination” within the 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
304   839 F.2d at 1280 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
305   839 F.2d at 1280 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
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He might have been stripped of good time credits or put in 
punitive segregation. These options are open still, but they are 
less valuable for two reasons.306 
Conclusion. The purpose of our investigation is to illuminate the 
intellectual company of those cases that deny Second Amendment rights to 
those deemed not “virtuous.” In sum, the raw search statistics suggested 
that, as to the rights of the non-virtuous, there is merely a significant 
deviation in approach, as between cases referencing the term “Second 
Amendment” and those that do not. However, after reviewing the 
language of the opinions, it is clear that understates the variation between 
the two classes of cases—those referencing “Second Amendment” and 
those not. 
Within the collected cases not referencing the Second Amendment, 
curtailing enumerated rights for those who are not virtuous is not the 
norm. And, in the rare modern cases where it was followed, the outcome is 
odious, revealing the misuse to which this approach has been put. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A number of aspects of treatment of felons’ firearms rights appears to 
evidence a hostility to exercise of the civil right. The history of the 
statutory restriction reflects an abdication of the legislative duty to make a 
considered decision in adopting statutes that curtail express rights—first 
allocating that duty to the Executive Branch, then allocating it to the 
courts. A class of persons with prior felony convictions—one supposes 
generally more affluent—was excluded from the prohibition.307 But there 
is no indication that this class of individual is less likely to abuse 
criminally the retained firearms rights, as compared to others whose 
firearms rights are taken away permanently.  
A principle underlying our contemporary schemes for assessing Equal 
Protection challenges is to allow invalidation of restrictions on express 
rights that are attributable to legislative hostility to their exercise.308 That 
appears to be the case at hand, subject to the compounding factor of a 
portfolio of exceptions not justified as promoting a suitable interest but, 
 
306   Id. at 1278. 
307   See supra notes 43–53 and accompanying text. 
308   In discussing strict scrutiny, Peter Rubin notes: 
[T]he inquiry into narrow tailoring—into the fit between classification and 
proffered goal—serves at least three distinct purposes. First, it ensures that the 
stated purpose was indeed the actual purpose behind the classification. A narrow 
tailoring inquiry can help to “smoke out” illegitimate purposes by demonstrating 
that the classification does not, in fact, serve the stated, legitimate purpose.”  
Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict 
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2000) (citing City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
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instead, providing special benefit to a class with no identifiable basis for 
entitlement. 
In the absence of an identifiable interest that is being promoted by the 
wholesale elimination of nonviolent felons’ firearms rights, contemporary 
courts rely on (i) an assessment of the general philosophy of persons in the 
Founding Era, and a theoretical analysis of the implications of those 
philosophical viewpoints309 and (ii) a selection of Founding-Era documents 
curated with a filter that predetermines a conclusion unsupported by 
review of an unfiltered sample.310 That leads contemporary courts to 
conclude that the Founders intended for there to be an implicit limit on 
the Second Amendment involving firearms restrictions of a type that 
simply did not exist in the Founding Era.311  
As we have seen, in the Founding Era, there were processes for 
restricting firearms rights of persons who were out and about. But, in 
contrast to the contemporary statutory scheme, which courts often 
summarily validate, the Founding-Era restrictions provided for judicial 
tailoring, both as to the identity of persons subject to restrictions as well 
as to the duration of the restrictions.312 That is, the Founding-Era 
restrictions allowed courts to match the restrictions to meet the rational 
objectives—as opposed to the contemporary statutory scheme that makes 
no pretense of being designed to do that. 
Were Congress to revise the felon firearms prohibition to be of limited 
duration, e.g., of five or perhaps ten years, it would be much more difficult 
for a court legitimately to find the limited ban to be qualitative different 
from the Founding-Era regime.  
In modern constitutional jurisprudence, the view that one’s express 
constitutional rights can be forfeited because one is “non-virtuous” is 
generally rejected outside the context of the Second Amendment.313 And 
those modern cases that relied on this principle did so to validate noxious 
prohibitions on non-commercial, consensual sexual activity—between 
same-sex couples and heterosexual couples.314 The judicial opinions that 
rely on this construct to read into the Second Amendment a limit without 
a glimmer of textual support, and the authors of those opinions, ought to 
be known by—and be held to account for—the odious company that they 
keep. 
 
309   See supra notes 66, 120–122 and accompanying text. 
310   See supra Part V.D. 
311   See supra Part V.E. 
312   See supra Part V.E. 
313   See supra Part VI. 
314   See supra notes 285–298 and accompanying text. 
